I

What is the purpose of dialogue logic? Upon inspection one must come to the conclusion that different authors were aiming at different objectives, and even that with one author these objectives were often changing over time. This section will briefly discuss the following: (1) objectives related to the foundations of mathematics; (2) the addition of a third approach to logic, next to models and proofs; (3) dialogue logic as a step in a systematic reconstruction of the language of science and politics; (4) dialogical models for argumentation theory.

(1) Paul Lorenzen's first known paper on dialogue logic, Logik und Agon, was presented in 1958 at an international congress in Venice (Lorenzen 1960). In this paper, as well as in the much better known Ein dialogisches Konstruktivitätskriterium, presented in 1959 (Lorenzen 1961), Lorenzen is mainly concerned with the foundations of mathematics. He declares himself to stand on the side of the constructivists rather than on that of the set theorists (Lorenzen and Lorenz 1978: 9). But what does "constructive" mean? Which statements are constructive? Lorenzen is unable to follow Brouwer's explications, nor is he satisfied with his own earlier attempts in the "operative logic" (Lorenzen 1955).
Decidability is too narrow a notion, and so apparently is the notion of "proof definiteness": a statement being proof definite iff it is decidable whether a proposed proof for it really is a proof (Lorenzen and Lorenz, 1978: 9-10). Lorenzen then proposes to enlarge the class of "constructive" statements by adding those built up from proof definite atomic statements in such a way as to enable us to discuss them in (reasonable) dialogues. The rules for these dialogues are to guarantee a clear result: one of the disputants having lost, the other won. The statements that can be discussed in this way Lorenzen calls *dialogisch definit* (dialogically definite), and he proposes to replace the vague notion of constructivity by this more precise notion (*op. cit.*: 10).

Clearly then, the task of dialogue theory in this context is to provide a criterion of (constructive) meaningfulness; constructive validity is not at issue. But once a system of dialogue rules has been established, it may be possible to give a justification for, say, the Heyting proof system, showing it to be both correct (for anything provable in the Heyting system there is a winning strategy for the Proponent in the dialogue system) and complete (the converse) (*op. cit.*: 13).

Thus it appears that there are two different objectives for dialogue theory in the context of foundations of mathematics. The first and primary objective is to provide a criterion of meaningfulness in terms of dialogical acts that are often described as attacks and defences. The well-known slogan "Don't ask for the meaning, ask for the use" is here translated as "To know what a sentence means, you must know how to attack and defend it". But, since problems of meaning are not restricted to mathematics, it is not surprising that this approach has found its way into a wider context: that of the *Erlanger Schule* project to reconstruct the language of science and politics (objective (3) above, see also below).

The second (and secondary) objective in this context is to yield foundations for a constructive logic, e.g. Heyting's system for intuitionistic logic. It is sometimes thought that Lorenzen's project suffered a drawback when it was discovered that a change in the rules of dialogue would make them yield classical logic instead (cp. Stegmüller 1964: 82). But in fact Lorenzen pointed out this possibility in his very first paper on the subject (1960; Lorenzen and Lorenz 1978: 8). After all, in some contexts of use one would expect classical logic to hold, and so it is no surprise if the rules of dialogue for these situations yield indeed a classical concept of validity. Nevertheless, most students of dialogue logic (the present author included) rejoice when their systems yield the Heyting logic. At the very least, they want them to yield some well-known logic, so that they can prove completeness and get their papers published. After a while, the study of different dialogue systems and their connection with various validity concepts became a subject in its own right, which brings us to the second objective of the four mentioned above.

(2) What does it mean to say that a certain conclusion C follows logically from a set of premises P?
from a set of premisses $P$? In other words, what do we mean by "$P/C$ is valid"?

There are, at present, at least three ways to go about this, i.e., three ways to introduce concepts of validity: by proofs, by models, and by dialogues.

According to the advocate of proofs, $C$ follows from $P$ iff $C$ can be derived from (at most) the premisses $P$ by (repeated) application of the rules of inference of some system. (There are different systems, and corresponding different notions of "inferential" validity.) But how is he to justify the rules of inference? Perhaps this can be done by reference to models.

The advocate of models stipulates that $C$ follows from $P$ iff there is no model of $P$ that is not also a model of $C$ (no countermodel to $P/C$). Again, there are different systems yielding different notions of "model-theoretic" or "semantic" validity. The advocate of models may indeed use his notion of validity to justify his colleague's rules of inference from the point of view of models (and thus prove a correctness theorem). But his own explanations display a strange circularity: whenever he proposes a semantic rule for some logical operator (such as "and" or "for all") the same operator is used in the explanation. To avoid a vicious circularity the explanations must be supposed to belong to another language than the language the semantic rules pertain to. How do the advocates of models determine a concept of validity for that other language, so that in that language they may have a reasonable discussion about model-theoretic issues? Perhaps dialogues need to be taken seriously.

According to the advocate of dialogues, $C$ follows from $P$ iff the Proponent of $C$ can, in principle, win any dialogue where her Opponent concedes the contents of $P$, whatever the objections or criticism that the latter might put forward. The rules that determine how and when the disputants may act in dialogue together constitute a dialectic system or dialogue game. Again there are many such systems. Discussion about the rules is rampant, and the advocate of dialogues may even want to consult his colleagues. Together they may try to establish connections between systems of different types (completeness theorems).

This is not the place to pronounce a verdict on the question of whose approach has priority, even if it were possible do so. It is sufficient if the above picture shows the advocate of dialogues as presenting a distinct approach to validity, and hence a distinct way "to do logic", a way that is not a priori inferior to either of the other approaches. This second objective of dialogue logic can be described as logic-internal. The third, however, largely exceeds the confines of logic.

(3) Lorenzen was well aware of the potential of the dialogical approach outside mathematics. Together with a group of mainly German philosophers (known as the "constructivists" or the Erlanger Schule), he worked over a long period on a project aiming at a critical reconstruction of the Bildungssprache, i.e., the language of philosophy, science, politics, etc. (Kamlah and Lorenzen 1967, 2nd
ed. 1973; Lorenzen and Schwemmer 1973, 2nd. ed. 1975; Lorenzen 1987). Their aim was to provide the intellectual means to end the present lack of discipline as people are writing nineteen to the dozen and talking at cross-purposes; to end the chaos in communication, for short (cp. Kamlah and Lorenzen 1973: 11). For this we must reconstruct our language step by step, making sure that each part is thoroughly understood by its users. As starting points we may make use of simple imperatives and other such speech acts as can be learned together with, and understood from, their context of nonlinguistic action, this action being the goal of the speech act (cp. Schwemmer and Lorenzen 1975: 22; Lorenzen 1987: 20). This so-called "empractical" (empraktisch, also: empragmatisch) use of language is safely kept in check by nonlinguistic action. All further steps in the construction of language must be teachable and verifiable as to their purpose (cp. Schwemmer and Lorenzen 1975: 10-11; Lorenzen 1987: 10). Fortunately, this process of learning can partwise remain imaginary: instead of actually taking part in many practical situations, it is sufficient if these situations are described to us in language we already understand (on the basis of the empractical use of language). This latter language is called "paralanguage" (Parasprache). Going through this process, we may finally reach terms such as "synthetische Wahrheit a priori" (synthetical a priori truth), "zufällig" (coincidental), "soziale Gebilde" (social structure), or "oder" (or) and actually know how to use them. The language thus reconstructed is called "ortholanguage" (Orthosprache). The dialogical introduction of logical constants is a certain phase of this systematic process of learning an ortholanguage. It is preceded by a "rational grammar"(rationale Grammatik, Lorenzen and Schwemmer 1975: 55; Lorenzen 1987: 52) for parts of speech and elementary sentences, including a survey of 216 well-founded locative prepositions. It is followed by further reconstructions, pertaining to arithmetic, geometry, ethics, politics, etc.

(4) The fourth objective of dialogue logic is to provide models for argumentation theory. This aim is not inconsistent with the ideal of an ortholanguage, but neither need it be restricted to that context. Let me briefly point out why argumentation theory, more specifically dialectical argumentation theory, needs models of dialogue. In the dialectical approach to argumentation the starting point for all arguments is found in differences of opinion. The goal of an argumentative process is to resolve a difference of opinion so as to reach a solid and well-founded agreement. It is not sufficient just to settle the difference by negotiation or to put an end to it in some ad hoc way. Therefore, the argumentative process must consist of a serious and critical discussion of the issues. The ideal format of this process is to be given by a model of discussion. Real life argumentative discussion may not follow this ideal format, but the theorist needs such a model to analyse and evaluate what actually goes on. Indeed the format of an argumentation may not even be that of an explicit discussion. The arguments could be contained in an extensive monological text, or speech. In that case the discussion
is said to be implicit, and the dialectical approach will try to analyse and evaluate the monologue as an expression of this implicit discussion.

Models of argumentative discussion can be more or less formal. In pragma-dialectics informal models based on speech act theory are used (Van Eemeren and Grootendorst 1992), in formal dialectics Lorenzen-type models are nowadays combined with Hamblin-type models (Hamblin 1970, Walton and Krabbe 1995). In general, formal dialogue games of different types constitute a kind of laboratory for the argumentation theorist, where small scale conceptual experiments are possible regarding concepts such as: making a claim, granting a concession, useless versus useful repetition, burden of proof, blunder, fallacy, relevance, being in the right versus being put in the right, etc. Further experiments concern different options for rules of dialogue as well as the interaction of rules of dialogue that seem separately plausible.

The field of formal dialectics is, nowadays, no longer tied exclusively to Lorenzen's rules. Nevertheless there are contexts for which these rules can still plausibly be defended. I want to discuss one such context in the next section.

II

Imagine the following situation: one (potential) dialogue partner, Abelard, pretends to know what the world is like, what objects of what types there are, and how they are related. He is the proponent, of not just a claim, but of a whole philosophical position. Eloise wants to oppose these pretensions, not by presenting a competing position of her own, but by immanent criticism, that is by beating Abelard on his own terms. Immanent criticism is generally considered to constitute a strong kind of criticism, and sometimes as the only kind of criticism of which critics of all-encompassing positions may avail themselves. I have argued before (Krabbe 1982), and will do so here again, that Lorenzen's rules impress themselves as particularly suitable instruments for the resolution of this type of intellectual conflict.

The simplest way Eloise could start her critical immanent attack on Abelard's position would be to put forward some statement which she knows would be hard to accept for Abelard, but which, so she claims, cannot be disallowed as long as Abelard adheres to his position. To take a hackneyed but simple example: let Abelard be a theist, and let Eloise put forward a statement of the form $A \rightarrow B$ to the effect that if God is omnipotent ($A$) He will be able to create a stone He Himself cannot lift from the ground ($B$). Suppose Abelard rejects this statement and challenges Eloise to show why he should accept it. Then this statement will serve as the thesis of the ensuing discussion. It is a provocative thesis, not something Eloise herself needs to maintain. The interesting thing is, that at this point there is a shift of roles. When originally Abelard takes the reunion of a position and Eloise
was the critic, it is now Eloise who is the proponent of a claim and Abelard who is
the opponent who resists acceptance of the claim. It is Eloise who has to do the
arguing so that Abelard will not be able to withhold consent to the thesis as long as
he upholds his theological tenets, and it is Abelard who will try to offer critical
resistance. Short, they are in for a critical dialogue with Eloise in the role of the
Proponent (P) who defends a thesis (the provocation) and Abelard in the role of the
Opponent (O) who has granted a number of concessions (the theological tenets).

Suppose Abelard and Eloise agree to use a Lorenzen-type system to try to
resolve their difference of opinion. Then Abelard must reframe his challenge as an
"attack" according to the appropriate Lorenzen rule; that is, he must concede (for
the sake of argument) the antecedent (A): that God is omnipotent, whereas Eloise
will then assert (relative to Abelard's position) the consequent (B): that He is able to
create the notorious stone. (She could postpone this, but there is no point in doing
so.) Thus the original position presented by Abelard is now expanded by statement
A, whereas the provocative thesis has been replaced by a new provocation: B.
Abelard's next move must be an "attack" on B.

Now, according to Wilfrid Hodges, Abelard is not attacking Eloise, but
helping her to perform her task, and I agree that in a sense he is. The word "attack"
is indeed rather inappropriate and its use unnecessary. I would rather speak of O's
challenges (and P's defences). All the same, the dialogue remains competitive, since
both disputants pursue contrary aims. That O is sometimes seen to be helping P, is
only because the rules of the game give him no option to be less helpful. The same
can happen in many competitive games. Again, on another level the game is indeed
also cooperative, since both disputants have agreed to use it to resolve their
difference.

Lorenzen's rule for "\rightarrow" is thus seen to be entirely appropriate for the present
context of dialogue. The same holds for Lorenzen's other rules, when they are read
as describing modes of challenge by O and defence by P (Krabbe 1982). But how
about using these rules the other way around (challenge by P and defence by O)?
Strictly speaking they cannot be used the other way around, since it is not O who is
presenting a provocative thesis, and hence there is nothing for P to challenge.
Certainly, there is no point in challenging a (potentially helpful!) concession.
Though from the formalities of the Lorenzen dialogues one may get the impression
that the same rule for "\rightarrow" is used by P to challenge a concession, say C\rightarrow D,
the intuitive interpretation of such moves must be completely different.

What O admits, when C\rightarrow D is among his concessions, is that as soon as this
set of concessions is enlarged by C, then he will be unable to withhold consent to
D. Now, P may make use of this concession by claiming that O, given the present
set of concessions, can indeed not withhold consent to C. In that way, P may try to
obtain a concession D she might need to defend her thesis. P's move according to
Lorenzen's rule for "\rightarrow" is here interpreted as asserting a claim to O; O is not
allowed to challenge P's move, but only to provide a concession. In practice, O would
be able to provide the concession as long as he feels comfortable with it.
to challenge \( C \) or are you willing to concede \( C \) and therefore, given your concession \( C \rightarrow D \), to concede \( D \)? (In extant formulations of Lorenzen dialogues only \( D \) is conceded, and the concession \( C \) is actually skipped, but that is not essential.)

For instance, Abelard may have conceded a statement of the form \( C \rightarrow D \) to the effect that if God can perform any action (\( C \)) He can create any object (\( D \)). Eloise may want to use this in a chain leading from Abelard's concession that God is omnipotent (\( A \)) to her provocative thesis about the stone (\( B \)). She then asks Abelard to concede that God can perform any action (\( C \)), and therefore can create any object (\( D \)), or else to challenge the new provocative thesis that God can perform any action (without a change in the set of concessions). Clearly Eloise is not challenging the concession \( C \rightarrow D \), rather is she asking a question with reference to this concession in order to get another concession as the answer. Thus interpreted, Lorenzen's rule for "\( \rightarrow \)" is again seen to be entirely appropriate.

The other Lorenzen rules for logical constants can similarly be given a dual interpretation: as a rule for challenge (by O) and defence (by P) and as a rule for question (by P) and answer (by O) (Krabbe 1982). So, actually, there are two rules for each constant. That they formally coincide happens to be true in first order predicate logic, but is not a principle of dialogue logic (cp. the failure operator in Hoepelman and Van Hoof 1993). The following description of the "logical rules" for propositional operators and quantifiers (adapted from Krabbe 1997: 20) stresses this dual nature ("\( A[a/x] \)" denotes the result of substituting \( a \) for free occurrences of \( x \) in \( A \)):

\[ A[a/x] \]
Table of Logical rules:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Rule</th>
<th>Statement</th>
<th>Challenge/Question</th>
<th>Defence/Answer</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>→</td>
<td>$A \rightarrow B$</td>
<td>$(?) A$</td>
<td>$B$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>¬</td>
<td>$\neg A$</td>
<td>$(?) A$</td>
<td>$\bot$ (an elementary statement of absurdity)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>∨</td>
<td>$A \lor B$</td>
<td>?</td>
<td>$A$ (defendant/answerer chooses)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>∧</td>
<td>$A \land B$</td>
<td>$L?$ (challenger/questioner chooses)</td>
<td>$A$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>∀</td>
<td>$\forall x \ A$</td>
<td>$(?) A$</td>
<td>$A[a/x]$</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

To define a system of dialogue, it is not sufficient to have a set of logical rules. One also needs structural rules, to regulate such things as turn taking, and
here (but see Krabbe 1982). I just mention that the structural rules have been more hotly debated in the literature than the logical rules, because of their (often) asymmetric character. Generally these rules are not dualizable by interchanging O and P, whereas many people have thought that they should be. But given the asymmetric starting point of a dialogue based on immanent criticism, it is, in the present context, at least plausible that duality fails. For instance, one asymmetric structural rule tells us that the rule for elementary statements quoted above can only be used by O, and never by P. In the present context, this is no surprise, since the goal of questioning with reference to a concession (by P) is to use that concession to get other and logically simpler concessions, whereas elementary statements have no potential to lead to further concessions of that kind.

Thus it can be shown that in a context of immanent criticism a Lorenzen type system of dialogue is indeed a viable option. For this it was needed to make a sharp distinction between claims (assertions) and concessions as different types of commitment in dialogue, a distinction Lorenzen never stressed. Barth and Krabbe (1982) made a clear distinction between roles in dialogue, but still spoke indiscriminately of attacks and defences. Different types of commitment were, however, a main theme in Walton and Krabbe (1995).

III

One thing that has worried many people about Lorenzen dialogues is that on the one hand these dialogues are supposed to give us a model of rational behavior in discussion, whereas on the other hand winning such a dialogue falls way short of having presented a proof or refutation of the main thesis. Eloise may win a dialogue without presenting a proof for the thesis, Abelard may win without presenting a refutation. For instance, as Wilfrid Hodges points out, if the thesis is conjunctive, $A \land B$, Abelard may ask only for the proof of $A$; or even less than that, since $A$ may again be of conjunctive form. The question is whether we can do without a notion of "proof" if we want to speak of "rational argument". But in dialogue logic it seems that matters are turned upside down: the explication of the notion of proof (as a winning strategy for Eloise) is based on the notion of rational argument (as explicated by the dialogue games).

The relations between the various notions of proof and between proof and dialogue are further explored in Krabbe 1997. The question has also been discussed within the Erlanger Schule, where Friedrich Kambartel (1979, 1982) stressed the primacy of proofs (Begründungen) and Kuno Lorenz (1982) that of possible ways to argue (Argumentationsmöglichkeiten).

But, actually, we have now reached a point where we do not need to worry about dialogues won by Eloise that are not containing a proof of the thesis. The context...
of immanent criticism, sketched in Section II, provides indeed an occasion where arguments are asked for, but a full proof is not required. What Eloise should do is make Abelard accept the thesis (by rational means, for sure) and for this all that is needed is meeting Abelard's challenges. So, if the thesis is conjunctive and Abelard happens to be interested in only one of the conjunctive parts, that is fine. Eloise may skip what Abelard takes for granted.

Yet one may object that Abelard, after having seen that Eloise can meet his challenge aimed at one conjunct, may want to see how Eloise would have answered had he aimed his challenge at the other conjunct, and similarly for other situations where Abelard had an option. If we grant such backtracking rights to Abelard (and similar rights to Eloise) we get another dialogue game that may be a more realistic instrument for the resolution of differences of opinion. What was first one play in the game is now called a "chain of arguments" (a notion introduced by Else Barth). In the new game, a chain of arguments is, generally, merely a part of a play, as a play runs through consecutive (parts of) chains of arguments. In terms of the old game in extensive form, the chains of arguments correspond with the branches of the tree.

There must be rules stipulating how shifts to another chain of arguments are to be executed, and there must be rules for winning and losing in the new game. Some proposals are found in Barth and Krabbe (1982: 76, on the "fundamental norm of a thoroughgoing dialectics", cp. also pp. 71-72), where the backtracking move is called "retracing one's steps". For instance, it is proposed that whosoever abandons a chain of arguments has lost that chain of arguments, and that who loses (wins) the last chain of arguments, loses (wins) the discussion as a whole; also some care is taken to avoid replays of (parts of) chains of arguments. Strategically the extended games do not differ from the original games: a winning strategy that holds for the one can be reformulated as one that holds for the other (pertaining to the same thesis and the same set of concessions).

On the basis of this extended type of Lorenzen dialogue game, a number of different concepts of (capabilities for) winning and losing were distinguished by Barth and Martens (1977). In order of strength we have for Eloise (adapted from Barth and Martens 1977: 94-95, but with number (4) inserted by the present author):

(1) Winning one chain of arguments.

(2) Winning all the chains of arguments Abelard actually brings up, until Abelard can think of no other option.

(3) Having a winning strategy that holds against any Opponent that grants all the concessions Abelard did grant. (In other words: a winning strategy that...
holds for all the chains of argument Abelard brings up, or could bring up.)

(4) As with (3), the concessions being such as would be generally acknowledged by the company of discussants to which Abelard and Eloise belong.

(5) Having a winning strategy that holds against any Opponent, no matter what concessions are granted.

These notions, which were used by Barth and Martens to clarify a number of views on the argumentum ad hominem, are here adduced to stress the legitimacy of a notion of "winning a discussion by rational means" that is independent of, but can be used to introduce, a notion of proof. Some may even want to accept (1) as such a notion, but otherwise (2) may fill the bill. Winning in the sense of (2), may be described as an ad hominem victory, but that does not imply that there is anything wrong with it. Proof in the sense of (3) is also ad hominem. Proof in sense of (4) is valid within a company, but not beyond, so it might be called ad societatem, rather than ad hominem. The same holds for proofs in the sense of (5), since they are only valid for those that share the Proponent's rules of dialogue. None of these is wrong in itself.

What is wrong is to exaggerate what has, in a particular case, been achieved: to claim to have won a discussion, whereas one has only won one chain of arguments, the Opponent being eager to enter another one; or, to claim to have proved the thesis from the concessions, whereas one has only met this Opponent's criticism; or, to claim to have proved the thesis from concessions that are generally acknowledged, whereas they are peculiar to this Opponent; or, to claim to have proved the conclusion in an absolute sense, whereas one's proof depended upon certain concessions. Such mistakes can be called basic ad hominem fallacies (cp. Whately 1836: 196-197; Barth and Martens 1977: 82-84, comments on Whately; Walton 1987: 318, and 1989: 165, on the basic ad hominem fallacy; Van Eemeren and Grootendorst 1992: 186-187, on "making an absolute of the success of the defense").

IV

It is time to discuss the particular problems brought forward by Wilfrid Hodges in his section on "destruction". I shall discuss five problems: the problem about Lorenzen's rule that P is not allowed to state an elementary (a simple) sentence unless it has already been stated by O, which I shall call Problem Zero; Problem One about the sense in which an absurd defence can be called a defence; Problem Two about the manner in which an absurd defence can be called a defense; Problem Three about the manner in which an absurd defence can be called a defense; and Problem Four about the manner in which an absurd defence can be called a defense.
Two A about the necessity of bringing new material into the discussion; Problem Two B about "attacks" being no attacks, but helpful invitations to argue in a certain way or permissions to skip part of a defence; and Problem Three about the neglect of a certain mode of attack.

Problem Zero. I agree that Lorenzen's rule for elementary sentences is unnecessary, and even a bit awkward. For one thing it seems to forbid one to start a discussion about an elementary thesis that is not among the initial concessions. The rule was dropped in Barth and Krabbe 1982; instead it was stipulated that as soon as a debater would have incurred the obligation to defend a sentence that had been conceded by his or her adversary, he or she could do so by uttering the words *Ipse dixisti!* or *You said so yourself!* and thus win the chain of arguments (Barth and Krabbe 1982: 68f). Other rules lead to the effect that only P is ever in the position to win in this way. It can then be proved that P can safely adhere to Lorenzen's rule as a strategy.

Wilfrid Hodges claims that "nothing prevents a person from granting something 'for the sake of argument' at an early stage of a dialogue and then attacking it later." But this would mean that this person has retracted the earlier concession. In our terms the two moves (conceding and "attacking") would belong to different chains of arguments. Within the same chain, one should not be allowed to act in this way, or more precisely: such behavior should lead to an immediate loss (of the chain, not of the discussion as a whole) if the other debater points out the incongruity.

Problem One. For a statement put forward as a defence to be successful it must again be defendable upon challenge, and so on. Since such a statement constitutes a new provocative thesis, the question whether it might be successfully defended can only be answered (if it can) relative to the set of concessions. This does not exclude that even absurd claims can be successfully defended. For instance "my name is Julius Caesar" can be defended successfully if the other party has conceded that one's name is what one calls oneself and that I call myself Julius Caesar. And once my opponent has admitted that my name is Julius Caesar, he should of course admit any disjunction of which this statement is an immediate constituent. Even $\bot$ can be a sensible provocative thesis. In fact, it can be used as a standard way to claim that O's position is inconsistent.

Problem Two A. I agree that it is an unrealistic feature of many Lorenzen-type dialogues that, once the dialogue is under way, no really new material can be brought in to bear on the issue under debate. In Krabbe 1988 I have tried to amend this situation by allowing P to make so-called *creative moves*. In one format, a creative move by P consists of a defence move using any sentence P may like. O must then either "attack" this sentence (tenability criticism) or concede it (relevance criticism, since P must now proceed with the defence of the original claim on the basis of the new concession). I can therefore theoretically achieve that
difference: P has a winning strategy in the expanded system iff he has one in the old system. In this way Lorenzen-type dialogues can be amended to allow for the introduction of new material.

Even so, some may think that a realistic model of dialogue needs more than just these opportunities for P. For instance, one could want to grant to O opportunities to insert an inquiry that may yield an update of the set of concessions. In that case, however, we would have left the realm of immanent criticism.

Jean's criticism on Julie's position does not look like immanent criticism to me. But if you want to analyse it as a case of immanent criticism then you may do so as follows: Julie has conceded that the people love her (A), Jean's provocative thesis is \( \square \neg A \) (so \( \neg A \) is not introduced by a rule, but is part of the initial situation), Julie's challenge remains implicit, and the rest of Jean's turn (about the spitting) constitutes a creative defence move. It is now up to Julie to decide whether she wants to challenge the spitting or to concede it.

**Problem Two B.** That some "attacks" may be helpful for the other party was already admitted in Section II. Once again the word "challenge" seems more appropriate, since challenges are often helpful. In Section II it was also apparent that cooperativeness does not exclude competition. To reach the common goal of resolution of a difference of opinion the disputants agree (cooperation!) to take on opposing roles (competition!). Moreover, whereas both disputants are cooperative in that they want a resolution, they each pursue a different kind of resolution. Further, it may be noticed that when the claim is conjunctive, and O chooses one conjunct for P to defend, this may not display as much helpfulness on O's side as one might at first think: O may keep the other conjunct in reserve for another chain of arguments.

**Problem Three.** According to Wilfrid Hodges, there are at least two ways you can attack a claim: "you can argue that it is not true, or you can argue that even if it is true, it is useless for further deductions". According to Hodges, Lorenzen overlooks the second. The situation is even worse: Lorenzen also overlooks the first, since a claim A is not "attacked" by \( \neg A \). In a context of immanent criticism, it is P who claims and O who challenges ("attacks" the claim), but O does so in neither of the two ways mentioned, since O does not argue at all. Only P argues (Krabbe 1988). A situation where both disputants have a claim to defend is more complicated than the situations considered in Lorenzen-type dialogue theory (but see Walton and Krabbe, 1995, Ch. IV).

The second type of attack mentioned by Hodges seems to refer to a different claim: a claim to the effect that the first claim is useful for further deductions. Probably there are many more claims about a claim. But dialogue theory pertains to claims of all kinds, so what did Lorenzen overlook? Perhaps Hodges merely means to say that both the tenability and the relevance of a claim can be challenged (Næss in dialogue, Næss 1966, Krabbe 1987). But the criticism on that Lorenzen-type dialogue theory (but see Walton and Krabbe, 1995, Ch. IV).
wholly overlooks the second way of challenging. Granted, if P defends a thesis
directly (that is, by one of the defence moves) the relevance of the defence is
guaranteed by the rules of dialogue, and there is no point in allowing O to challenge
the relevance of the claim put forward as a defence. But if P defends her thesis
indirectly, say by questioning with reference to a concession \( C \to D \), she has to put
forward \( C \) as a claim, and subsequently both tenability criticism (challenging \( C \))
and relevance criticism (conceding \( D \), thus challenging P to defend the thesis once
the route over \( C \) and \( D \) has been taken) will be available as options for O. The same
options arise when a claim is put forward in the context of a creative defence move.

Finally, what to say about the Strindberg example where, according to
Hodges, Julie attacks Jean's claim \( A \to B \) by stating \( \neg A \)? In fact, Jean's utterance of
"If you take my advice, you'll go to bed" counts as little as a claim as Julie's
utterance "Do you think I'm going to be ordered about by you?" counts as a
question. Both are indirect speech acts, and express not what they superficially
seem to express. What happens is that Jean's utterance expresses an advice: the
advice to go to bed. Julie's utterance expresses a kind of negative promise. They are
not debating \( A \to B \) (the literal sense of Jean's utterance) since that would mean they
would be debating whether Jean has indeed given the advice to go to bed (and not
some other advice), for that again would be decisive for the truth of \( A \to B \). They are
not debating this, since for both of them the content of Jean's advice is quite clear.

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