1. The Antagonism Between Rhetoric and Dialectic

The purpose of this paper is to briefly describe and compare the original goals and perspectives of both rhetoric and dialectic in theory and in practice. But, since this is an undertaking that would surely exceed the boundaries of any single paper, the best thing to do is to start at once with working definitions of rhetoric and of dialectic that will conveniently limit the subject. Hopefully, these limitations will not impair the paper's further goal of contributing to a better appreciation of contemporary attempts to integrate rhetoric with dialectic.¹

By "dialectic" I shall understand the practice and theory of conversations; by "rhetoric" the practice and theory of speeches. Conversations, then, constitute instances of the practice of dialectic, whereas speeches constitute instances of the practice of rhetoric.

For a theory of dialectic I shall, in Section 2, turn to Aristotle's *Topics* (and *Sophistical Refutations*) to gain an insight into the various types and purposes of conversations. As to theory of rhetoric: I shall only briefly mention the goals of rhetoric, taken from Aristotle's *Rhetoric* (Section 3). Indeed, this paper will focus primarily on dialectic, and one must not expect an even-handed treatment of the two fields.

From the stipulations just presented it seems that rhetoric and dialectic must be pretty close; the only difference being that rhetoric deals with speeches, whereas dialectic deals with conversations. Indeed, their realms of interest do overlap, since conversations may contain speeches, and a series of speeches can often be described as if it were a conversation between their authors. This closeness accords with Aristotle's characterization of rhetoric as a "counterpart of Dialectic" (ἀντίστροφος, antistrofos, Rhet. I 1.1, 1354a1), and also as "an offshoot of Dialectic" (παραφυνὲς τι, parafues ti, Rhet. I 2.7, 1356a25), ² and a "sort of division" (μόριον τι, morion ti, Rhet. I 2.7, 1356a30-31) and "likeness" (ὁμοίωμα, homoiòma, Rhet. I 2.7, 1356a31)³ of it. There is no need, in the present context, to stress the primacy of dialectic, so evident in these quotes. Let it be enough for us to observe that, according to Aristotle, the two fields were indeed very much akin.

Yet, on the other hand, rhetoric and dialectic were very much opposed. For one thing, Plato's appreciation of rhetoric was markedly different from Aristotle's. Though what Plato's appreciation exactly amounted to remains a moot question, one may observe that it gave rise to a tradition of mutual antagonism between the two fields. In the *Gorgias* Socrates denounces rhetoric as a kind of "flattery" (κολακεία, kolakeia) and "the semblance (εἰδόλον, eidolon) of a part of politics" (463a-d).⁴ Later on in the same dialogue Callicles denounces philosophy (and we

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¹ The author gratefully acknowledges to have profited from many discussions (mainly about Aristotle’s *De Sophisticis Elenchis*) with Pieter Sjoerd Hasper, who also gave helpful comment on an earlier version of this paper (Krabbe, 2000).

² But rhetoric is also an offshoot of ethics/politics: "Thus it appears that Rhetoric is as it were an offshoot of Dialectic and of the science of Ethics, which may be reasonably called Politics" (Rhet. I 2, 1356a25-27). All quotes from Aristotle, as well as English translations, are taken from the Loeb Classical Library editions listed among the references.

³ Some manuscripts have ὁμοίωα, homoiia, instead of ὁμοίωμα, homoiòma, see Aristotle (1976a). This, however, does not change the meaning.

⁴ Plato's "semblance" seems not so different from Aristotle's "likeness". But, whereas Aristotle's term, ὁμοίωμα (homoiòma, likeness), is a neutral one, Plato's term, εἰδόλον, (eidolon, semblance) carries the negative
may presume, dialectic as well) as good only for youngsters, but a ridiculous pastime for grown-up people (485a-e); Socrates is advised to drop philosophy in favor of serious business (486c).

The common reproaches to rhetoric hold that it produces feigned and untruthful speeches, addressed to man's lower instincts, rather than to reason, and possessed of unnecessary bombast and flowery use of language. Contrariwise, dialectic will be described as useless logic chopping, full of sophistry and leading to no practical gains. This was not Aristotle's point of view. The common features of and the differences between the Aristotelian conceptions of rhetoric and dialectic will be summarized in Section 4.

In Section 5 Plato's Protagoras will be used to illustrate both dialectical and rhetorical practice as well as their interrelatedness. The way rhetoric and dialectic are intertwined on the practical level will be specified in Section 6, whereas Section 7 points forward to an integration on the level of theory.

2. Types and Goals of Dialectic

To what types of conversation (or: dialogue) did dialectic originally refer? On the practical side, one may take the Socratic dialogues as instances of dialectic exchanges. On the face of it, a Socratic dialogue most often aims at getting at the truth of some matter by answering a question like "Is X Y?" or "What is X?" (Richard Robinson, 1970, 49). Thus the dialogue would be a type of cooperative inquiry aiming at (philosophical) knowledge.

However, the practice of these "inquiries" displays many features of persuasion dialogues and even of eristic quibbling. Moreover, the Questioner (most often Socrates) displays a technique of refutation of a definitely more personal character than needed for a disinterested use of reductio ad absurdum arguments in objective proof. In Socratic elenchus, it is the Answerer himself who is refuted, not just his thesis. Elenchus, though painful, is supposed to have beneficial effects on the soul of its victim. According to Richard Robinson (1970, 15): "In order to make men virtuous, you must make them know what virtue is. And in order to make them know what virtue is, you must remove their false opinion that they already know. And in order to remove this false opinion, you must subject them to elenchus." Thus the ultimate purpose of these dialogues seems to be educational in a moral sense.

Looking for some theory of types of dialogue in Aristotle, we find in his Sophistical Refutations (De sophisticis elenchis) four types of argument (λόγος, logos) that are used in conversation (ἐν τῷ διαλέγεσθαι, en tòi dialegesthai): didactic arguments, dialectical arguments, examination arguments, and eristic (contentious) arguments (SE 2, 165a38-39). Admittedly, this is a classification of arguments, not of types of dialogue, and the passage continues citing definitions of these types of argument that do not refer to types of dialogue. Nevertheless, the names of these types of argument can be taken to refer to types of dialogue: didactic, dialectical (in a narrower sense), examination, and eristic dialogues. These may be taken to provide characteristic (but not necessarily exclusive) contexts for the four types of arguments. Clearly, these types of argument and of dialogue correspond to various aspects of the Socratic dialogues.

A parallel passage in the Topics mentions three types of (conclusive) reasoning (συλλογισμος, sullogismoi): demonstration, dialectical reasoning, and eristic (contentious) reasoning (Top. I 1, 100a27-101a4). These are given definitions similar to those given in the Sophistical Refutations of didactic, dialectical, and eristic arguments, respectively. The examination arguments are missing, but these appear to have been comprised among the connotation of being a mere semblance and not the real thing. All Greek quotes from Plato are taken from his (1965) and English translations from his (1961) (for Gorgias) and from his (1991) (for Protagoras).
dialectical arguments (*SE* 11, 171b3-6). Examination arguments are used to investigate whether an alleged expert is really knowledgeable in his field. As such they are on the one hand continuous with the Socratic elenchus, and on the other hand of interest in the light of our contemporary problems of democratic or juridical assessment of expert opinion.

Yet another type of (conclusive) reasoning is introduced in the *Rhetoric*: the enthymeme. Though dialectic in a wide sense may be supposed to deal with all these types of dialogue, including the didactic type, where demonstrations (scientific proofs) are presented, the opening statement of the *Topics* clearly announces that this work will deal with dialectic conversations in a narrower sense: the type of dialogue where dialectic reasoning is prominent (*Top.* I 1, 100a18-24). Dialectic reasoning, again, is defined as reasoning from reputable (*ἐνδοξα, endoxa*) premises (*Top.* I 1, 100a29-30), and these are premises that "commend themselves to all or to the majority, or to the wise — that is, to all of the wise or to the majority or to the most famous and distinguished of them" (*Top.* I 1 100b21-23).

More light on the goals of this type of conversation is thrown by *Topics* I 2 (101a25-b4), where Aristotle explains what purposes his study will serve. Actually, he mentions uses of the dialectic practice itself, indicating briefly how the method to be set forth will support these uses. The passage gives us a somewhat better idea of dialectic conversation as a type of dialogue. It may also be read as a further division of dialectic conversation (in a narrower sense) into subtypes, where each subtype is concerned with one particular use of dialectic. Thus, one type of dialectic conversation would aim at training its participants (*γυμνασία, gymnasia*); another would deal with encounters (*ἐντεύξεις, enteuxes*), and may be taken to comprise, or perhaps to be coextensive with, the examination dialogues; the third type would aim at philosophical and scientific purposes: the goal is to discern truth and falsehood. The third type is especially important for the discussion of the "ultimate bases of each science" (*Top.* I 2, 101a36-37).

None of these subtypes of dialectic practice can easily be identified with present-day critical discussion or persuasion dialogue (Barth and Krabbe, 1982; Van Eemeren and Grootendorst, 1984, 1992; Walton and Krabbe, 1995). Indeed the general goal of resolution of a dispute (a difference of opinion) and the participants' aims of convincing the other are remarkably absent from the picture. Not that disputes do not occur in dialectic practice. Of course they do, since many parts of a dialogue aimed at, say, inquiry can be described as attempts to convince the other. That is, they contain critical dialogues as subordinate parts, or as an aspect of what is going on. Clearly, Socratic elenchus is not successful if the victim will not, in the end, be convinced of his lack of knowledge. And in the examination dialogue, the alleged expert will try to convince the other that he really is an expert. But the primary purpose of most dialectic practices is not to convince or to persuade, but to attain at a truth of some sort by inquiry. The

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5 The passage in the *Topics* continues to mention a fourth type of reasoning: fallacious arguments (*παραλογισμοί, paralogismoi*) within certain sciences, such as geometry (*Top.* I.1, 101a5-17).
6 According to Robin Smith (1993, 350) the uses mentioned in *Topics* I 2 are the uses of Aristotle's treatise (the *Topics*) rather than those of dialectic. Though no doubt the uses of the treatise are what is primarily at issue, I would nevertheless maintain that these uses are explained in terms of the uses of dialectic.
7 It is, however, a moot question whether, according to Aristotle, dialectic is capable of establishing any truth, let only the first principles of the sciences. Cf. Irwin (1988), who is in favor of ascribing such a capacity to dialectic, and Smith (1993) who criticizes this idea. Bolton (1994) defends the point of view that dialectic may establish things, though not in the sense of giving a scientific justification.
8 For the notion of a resolution of a difference of opinion or dispute see Van Eemeren and Grootendorst (1992, 34). Cf. the notion of a conflict of avowed opinions in Barth and Krabbe (1982, 56).
9 Consequently, the meaning of the term "dialectic", when it is used, not as a neutral term for the practice or theory of dialogue, but to denote the best method to be followed in dialogue, may shift according to what is considered the best method of inquiry. This is evident in Plato. According to Robinson (1970, 70) "the word 'dialectic' had a strong tendency in Plato to mean 'the ideal method, whatever that may be'. In so far it was thus merely a honorific title, Plato applied it at every stage of his life to whatever seemed to him at the moment the most hopeful procedure." (Italics as in the original.)
examination dialogue, too, may be conceived as a method of inquiry. As a theoretically established primary purpose persuasion belongs to rhetoric rather than to dialectic.

3. **Types and Goals of Rhetoric**

Aristotle defines rhetoric as "the faculty of discovering the possible means of persuasion in reference to any subject whatever" (*Rhet. I* 2.1, 1355b26-27). These means encompass not only arguments (logos), but also display of character by the speaker (ethos) and arousing emotion in the hearers (pathos) (*Rhet. I* 2.3-6, 1356a1-20). Thus the definition covers a wide range of speech activities, be it that they must all be related to persuasion. Logos constitutes the core-business of rhetoric (*Rhet. I* 1.3-4, 1354a11-18), but other means of persuasion are not neglected by Aristotle. If, for the moment, we take it for granted that rhetoric pertains to speeches (for these means of persuasion could very well be used outside the context of a delivered speech), we see that according to Aristotle rhetoric does not pertain to all kinds of speeches, but only to those that aim to persuade. Later on the range of rhetoric is narrowed down to three main types or genres of speeches, each with its own ends: the deliberative, the forensic, and the epideictic; there is an alleged proof that these are all the kinds there are (*Rhet. I* 3.1, 1358a36-b8).

Earlier, Aristotle remarks on the usefulness of rhetoric. Rhetoric can be used (1) to defend proper decisions (you may be right, but you will still need to convince others, otherwise you are to blame); (2) to convince those who cannot follow scientific arguments; (3) to argue both for and against the same proposition; not, indeed, in order to actually do so, but in order (3a) to have a realistic view of an issue and (3b) not to be duped by fallacies (*Rhet. I* 1.12, 1355a20-33). These points do not depend on the use of speeches, rather than conversations; the same claims would hold for a dialectic of persuasion. Both rhetoric and the dialectic of persuasion (the persuasion dialogue) share the primary goal of arriving at a shared opinion, or, more precisely, of resolving a (supposed) dispute. But, as we saw, Aristotle's dialectic is not primarily a dialectic of persuasion.

The ability of arguing for and against the same proposition leads to opportunities for a misuse of rhetoric, since one could deliberately argue for the wrong side of an issue (even though Aristotle says we should not do so, *Rhet. I* 1.12, 1355a30-31). Hence there is a black rhetoric besides the white rhetoric that Aristotle recommends. In dialectic the situation is not different, but here the black side is known by a special name: sophistry (cf. *Rhet. I* 1.14, 1355b18-21).

4. **Differences and Common Features**

It is time to take stock of the common features of, and of the differences between, the Aristotelian conceptions of rhetoric and dialectic. Four common features merit separate mention. As we saw, right in the beginning of his *Rhetoric* Aristotle states that "rhetoric is a counterpart of dialectic" (*Rhet. I* 1.1, 1354a1). He adduces the reason that "both have to do with matters that are in a manner within the cognizance of all men and not confined to any special science" (*Rhet. I* 1.1, 1354a1-3). And a little later he adds: "neither of them is a science that deals with the nature of any definite subject, but they are mere faculties (δύναμεις, dunameis) of furnishing arguments (λόγους, logous)" (*Rhet. I* 2.7, 1356a32-34). Thus both rhetoric and dialectic stand aloof from the special sciences; their practice, if not their theory, is to some extent common to all.\(^{10}\) This is

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\(^{10}\) In his *Sophistical Refutations*, too, Aristotle remarks that "dialectical argument has no definite sphere" (*SE* 11, 172a12) and, in particular, that examination arguments can be used by those without knowledge of a subject to test the pretensions of others (*SE* 11, 172a21-32).
one important common feature.

Another common feature is constituted by the fact that both "Rhetoric and Dialectic alone of all the arts prove opposites" (Rhet. I 1.12, 1355a33-35), that is they allow us to find arguments for both sides of an issue. Thus one of the features that is most commonly ascribed to dialectic argument, the concern for both the pros and the cons as it moves from thesis to antithesis, appears to be shared by the rhetorical mode of arguing.\(^\text{11}\)

Thirdly, as we saw, both arts can be misused, leading to sophistry and eristic argument in the case of dialectic, and to what I called black rhetoric in the case of rhetoric.

As a fourth common feature, I mention the means of (logical) proof of which rhetoric and dialectic avail themselves. These are "induction" (reasoning from cases) and the "syllogism" (conclusive reasoning). One may wonder why I mention these as common features, rather than as differences; aren't they replaced, in rhetoric, by their counterparts: the example and the enthymeme? But Aristotle calls proof by example "rhetorical induction", and proof by enthymeme "rhetorical syllogism" (Rhet. I 2.8, 1356a35-b10); the difference, if there is any, seems slight and no more than a consequence of the different context (speech versus conversation) in which the arguments are produced.\(^\text{12}\)

Let us now turn to differences. Of these I shall mention again four. First and foremost, dialectic deals with conversations, and hence with questions and answers, whereas rhetoric deals with continuous speech. This was our working definition.

Second, there is the issue of the size and the composition of groups of people that engage in dialectical or rhetorical practices. In the practice of dialectic one deals with two participants, or adversaries: the Questioner and the Answerer, and perhaps with a limited company of bystanders. Typically, both participants as well as the bystanders belong to some company of discussants, where a company of discussants may be defined as a group of people who explicitly or implicitly accept a common dialogical procedure, a profile of rationality. Typically the members of a company are on equal footing in that each of them in turn could act as a Questioner or an Answerer. When bystanders from outside the company become an influence, the dialogue shifts towards a debate, and hence to a more rhetorical situation, where the bystanders constitute an audience. In the fully rhetorical situation, there is a heterogeneous crowd listening to a speech. Even though the rhetor and his audience must, of course, still share some rules of communication, the idea of belonging to one company may be lost. Yet, the difference between rhetoric and dialectic given by the opposition of crowd and company may be not that absolute. Rather it could be a difference of degree.

Third, there is a difference of goals. We saw that the primary purpose of dialectic (in the narrower sense), as being mostly concerned with inquiry, is to attain at a truth of some sort, whereas that of rhetoric, as being concerned with persuasion, is to arrive at a shared opinion.\(^\text{13}\) In Aristotelian (as opposed to contemporary) dialectic the primary purpose is not the resolution of a dispute, even though it is not excluded that each participant also tries to convince the other or the bystanders of his point of view. This difference between goals explains why pathos and ethos, which are means of persuasion besides logos, but not means of inquiry, are not treated in the Topics.

Fourth, there is the matter of the subjects treated within rhetorical and dialectical

\(^{11}\) Cf. Rhet. II 25.1-4, 1402a29-37 ff. on counter-arguments and objections.

\(^{12}\) Yet, the requirement of deductive validity (impossibility of the premises being true and the conclusion false) for both the syllogism and the enthymeme is somewhat relaxed in the Rhetoric. The conclusion is only required to follow "either universally or in most cases" (Rhet. 1 2.9, 1356b16).

\(^{13}\) One needs to distinguish between the goal of an activity and the aims of its participants once they are engaged in that activity. Thus in persuasion dialogue the goal is to resolve a dispute, whereas both participants engaged in a persuasion dialogue have the opposed aims of convincing the other. Cf. Walton and Krabbe (1995, 67). Arguably, the primary goal of speeches, as a practice, is also to resolve disputes, whereas the aim of the rhetor is to persuade the audience.
contexts. Though officially both arts are universal and capable of dealing with any subject whatsoever,\textsuperscript{14} yet in practice dialectic is associated with theoretical and general subjects ("Is virtue teachable?") whereas rhetoric is most often applied to practical and specific cases ("Shall we send a fleet tomorrow?", "Is this man guilty?").\textsuperscript{15}

This survey of differences and common features shows that for Aristotle rhetoric and dialectic were clearly distinguished, though related, arts (or, on the level of the individual: faculties). In practice, however, the two were even more entangled than appears from this survey. The next section will illustrate this entanglement from Plato's Protagoras, a dialogue whose dramatic setting supposedly occurs roughly a hundred years before Aristotle wrote the Rhetoric.\textsuperscript{16}

5. Dialectic and Rhetoric in Practice

Let us go to Athens in the fifth century BC to knock on the door of the house of Callias. For, bringing with us some knowledge from our own age, we know that the great sophist Protagoras is staying there, and that Socrates and Hippocrates just went in to ask him whether it would be a good idea if Hippocrates let himself be educated by Protagoras.

But to get into the house of Callias, this morning, is not so easy. The doorman, a eunuch, is quite fed up with all the sophists, philosophers, and rhetoricians about the house. "No more sophists!" he cries, and slams the door in our face. We have to use a very convincing argument from pragma-dialectics to make him let us in (314c-e).

Once in, we marvel at seeing so many sophists and their students assembled. We see Hippias of Elis teaching from his throne; Prodicus of Ceos doing the same from his bed; and Protagoras of Abdera walking up and down with his pupils, their ranks neatly splitting each time the master turns around to go the other way (314e-316a).

We are there just in time to hear Socrates state his business, on behalf of Hippocrates; will they discuss this in private or in the presence of others? (316b-c). This matter is decided as Protagoras delivers a speech, arguing that it is better to do so "in the presence of all who are here" (316c-317c). Officially the conversation starts off as an information-seeking dialogue, for Socrates just asks to be informed what benefit Hippocrates would derive from associating with Protagoras (318a). On the face, they start an expert-consultation dialogue with Protagoras as the expert and Socrates as the layman. From this point of view the dialogue would be entirely irenic, and there would be no competition or opposition between Socrates and Protagoras.

But actually, of course there is. Protagoras affirms that if Hippocrates were to associate with him, he would become a better man each day, implying that it would indeed be a good idea for him to become his student (318a). Quite clearly, Socrates is not, thereby, convinced that such a step would be a good idea, and this also motivates his questioning. So here we meet with a dispute, a conflict of opinions. Hence, the ensuing discussion can also be looked upon as a persuasion dialogue (a critical discussion) aimed at the resolution of this dispute. As we shall see, both rhetorical and dialectical devices will be applied to this end. Yet, the overall organization of the encounter is dialectical; in most parts with Socrates as the Questioner and Protagoras as the

\textsuperscript{14} Rhetoric and dialectic are "not confined to any special science" (Rhet. I 1.1, 1354a3); "It is thus evident that Rhetoric does not deal with any one definite class of subjects, but, like Dialectic, [is of general application]" (Rhet. I 1.14, 1355b7-9); cf. Rhet. I 2.1, 1355b26-35.

\textsuperscript{15} The difference between the official range of rhetoric and the range of subjects actually encountered in rhetorical practice is borne out by the definition of the three genres, referred to in Section 3, which pretends to cover all possibilities, but actually narrows down the range of rhetoric to three commonly known areas (Rhet. I 3.1, 1358a36-b8).

\textsuperscript{16} We shall study this dialogue for just this purpose. It is not my intention to put forward any claim about what Plato actually wanted to achieve when he wrote the Protagoras.
A third aspect of the discussion is more threatening for Protagoras. The whole conversation may also be looked upon as an examination of Protagoras, to see whether he really is an expert. A failure in this examination in front of those present would clearly be very damaging.

Last but not least, there is the aspect of philosophical inquiry. The discussion, or at least parts of it may also be seen to constitute an attempt to get to the truth of some matters. One of these philosophical issues is the question whether excellence (ἀρετή, aretē) can be taught. Socrates delivers a rather short speech to show that it can not (319a-320c). Rhetorical means are used, but the speech as a whole is dialectically relevant to the foregoing conversation, since what is called into question happens to be a presupposition of Protagoras' position in the dialogue. The same holds for Protagoras' rather long, and partially narrative, counter-speech, in which the same presupposition is defended (320c-328d). After this bedazzling speech, there follows a silence. Socrates, spellbound, gazes at Protagoras, expecting him to resume talking. But he does not (328d).

Then Socrates, with some effort brings the discussion back to the dialectical mode: Protagoras' speech, he says, was excellent, but one small difficulty remains. To clear this up we must use dialectic and not invite another speech, for these orators are just like books, they do not answer questions. Protagoras, he says, is capable of both: delivering a splendid long speech and answering or asking questions. The small question that remains is whether justice, soundness of mind (σοφρόσυνη, sôphrosunē), and holiness, etc., are parts of excellence, or rather different names for the same thing (328d-329d). Protagoras affirms the former, and thus the dialectic questioning starts again, with Socrates as the Questioner (329d). This new dispute is only loosely connected to what went before.

Protagoras is not too comfortable in his role of an Answerer. He suffers refutation on a subsidiary issue (333a-b) and soon after tries to wriggle out of the dialectic mode by inserting a rhetorical digression. He delivers a short speech that does not answer the current question posed by Socrates, but that nevertheless is much applauded by the audience (334a-c). Socrates, however, complains that he cannot follow long speeches (334c-d). (The complaint is not fair: Protagoras' speech was not long, but irrelevant.) But who is to decide what is the appropriate length of an answer in a given case?

Here the discussion shifts to a metalevel, the issue being the rules of dialectic itself. On this level, the participants and the audience negotiate about procedures (334c-338e). Here a fifth aspect of the discussion makes its appearance: negotiation dialogue. This is most apparent where Socrates threatens to leave the scene (335b-c). The outcome of these negotiations is the following: the discussion will proceed in the dialectic rather than the rhetorical mode; both parties will take turns as Questioner and as Answerer; Protagoras will be the first Questioner; the audience as a whole will act as chairmen; if Protagoras does not stick to the question in his replies, Socrates and the audience will ask him "not to ruin the conversation" (this sanction may have been more severe than we appreciate) (338c-e).

Protagoras then questions Socrates about the consistency of a poem by Simonides (338e-339d). Soon Socrates appears to have been refuted (339d). There are cheers from the audience, and Socrates tells us that his eyes went dim and that he felt giddy, as if a good boxer had hit him.

Protagoras is brought to concede (1) that wisdom (σοφία, sophia) is the opposite of folly (αφρόσυνη, aphrosunē (332a); (2) that "each member of an opposition has only one opposite, not many" (332c); and that "folly is the opposite of good sense (σοφρόσυνη, sôphrosunē)" (332e); together these contradict the part of Protagoras' thesis that claimed that "wisdom is distinct from good sense" (333a).

Protagoras states that there are also good things that are not beneficial to men. Socrates then asks whether some things are good that are not beneficial to any man or not beneficial to all men. Protagoras reacts with a speech in which he points out that different things are beneficial or harmful for different species or for different parts of the body (333e-334c).
(339d-e). But then, after an intermezzo ("to gain time"), he defends himself, surprisingly not by picking up his turn as a Questioner, but by a relapse into the rhetorical mode: Socrates delivers a very long (but relevant) speech on the true interpretation of Simonides' poem (342a-347a). It may be that hermeneutics, by nature, requires long lectures, but still it is amazing that Protagoras and the audience did not object to this length of exposition. After this, the dialectic mode is restored, with Socrates as the Questioner and a rather reluctant Protagoras as the Answerer (347c).

Protagoras asserts that courage, at least, is altogether different from the other parts of excellence, since many men are unjust, irreligious, wanton, and ignorant, but most outstandingly courageous (349d). After a long period of questioning Protagoras is refuted (by that time his answers are reduced to grunts and nods): he has to admit that no ignorant man can be courageous (360e).

This last, dialectic episode contains an interesting rhetorical insertion in which Socrates pretends that he and Protagoras together try to convince the majority of people that, contrary to what these people believe, no man who knows what is best to do, and having the power to do so, will ever on account of being overcome by pleasure or pain not be willing to do it (352d-357e). In this passage the dialectic interchange between Socrates and Protagoras becomes less prominent until Socrates is virtually delivering a speech. Thus Socrates has made a move towards rhetoric. His speech, however, consists itself largely of an account of the imagined interaction between Socrates and Protagoras on one side and hoi polloi on the other. That is, the rhetoric makes use of an imagined dialectic to present its arguments. At the end of the passage, Socrates and Protagoras have their imaginary interlocutors admit that being weaker than pleasure really consists of (intellectual) error (ἀμάθεια, amathia). The rhetorical logos is then followed up by rhetorical pathos, for Socrates points out that the sophists present (Protagoras, Hippias, and Prodicus) claim to have the cure for this lack of knowledge (357e). This argumentum ad populum makes it very hard for the sophists to resist a conclusion that so favorably supports their practice of teaching. Socrates then takes advantage of this situation, in an intermediate dialogue, to get some more support from Hippias and Prodicus (358a-e).

As Socrates points out in his concluding remarks, the dialogue has a strange chiasmatic result: Socrates, who first maintained that excellence is not teachable, now claims that all kinds of excellence consist in knowledge, and so must be surely teachable. Protagoras, who claimed that these kinds of excellence are teachable, now tries to keep them apart from knowledge, which seems to conflict with their teachability.

All through the dialogue we have seen moves from dialectic to rhetoric and vice versa. The connection between the two seems even more intimate than we would gather from reading Aristotle. For one thing, dialectic practice has more of the character of a persuasion dialogue, and is therefore closer to rhetorical practice than we might have thought. Let us now see how exactly persuasive dialectic and rhetoric are intertwined, both at the practical and at the theoretical level.

6. Intertwining at a Practical Level: Embedding

At a practical level, rhetorical objects are speeches, whereas dialectical objects are conversations. Speeches can be embedded in conversations, and conversations can be embedded in speeches. By one speech event, A, being embedded in the other, B, I mean not only that A is a part of B, but also that A is functional in B (cf. Walton and Krabbe, 1995, 102). We have met with examples of such embedded speeches in the Protagoras.

In general, whenever in the course of a persuasion dialogue, one party expresses the need to put forward his arguments as a coherent whole, both parties may agree that the dialogue will be interrupted and that this party will deliver a full-fledged speech to explain and argue for its point of view. Provided that this speech is functional in the context of the persuasion dialogue,
that is, that it contributes to the resolution of the dispute, there is no objection to this procedure.\textsuperscript{19}

In a larger context, different speeches may be seen to react on one another and thus to be embedded in a larger dialectical structure, even if this structure does not constitute what one would normally call a persuasion dialogue (cf. Blair, 1998).

The other way around, scraps of dialectic interaction may be embedded in a speech. This need not interfere with the purposes of the speech. In fact, interrupters and hecklers may introduce illuminating altercations that not only enliven a speech, but even may enhance its effectiveness. (Though, of course, there may be practical objections.)

Another way to embed some dialectic parts in a speech is to introduce a virtual dialogue. We saw how Socrates cleverly availed himself of this device in the \textit{Protagoras}.

7. \textit{Intertwining at a Theoretical Level: Integrated Analysis}

The embedding of speeches in conversations and of conversations in speeches, as it is displayed in rhetorical and dialectical practice, calls for an integration of their theories. Partly, this integration has been achieved by pragma-dialectics, where the analysis of dialogues is fundamental and speeches are analyzed in terms of the dialogues implicit in them. In this respect the theory of persuasive speech has already been integrated with that of the persuasion dialogue (Van Eemeren and Grootendorst, 1992). A further integration of rhetorical points of view with pragma-dialectical analysis is undertaken in some recent papers by Van Eemeren and Houtlosser (e.g.: 1999, 1999a, 1999b, 2000). They show how by what they call strategic maneuvering the discussants may achieve rhetorical aims without (necessarily) abandoning dialectic norms.\textsuperscript{20} Fallacies can then be analyzed as derailments of strategic maneuvering (Van Eemeren and Houtlosser, 2002).

Within dialogue theory, Walton and Krabbe (1995) have moved towards a more encompassing theory of dialectic, bringing in various types of dialogue besides the persuasion dialogue. A fully integrated theory of speech and conversation, however, will not only account for the various other types of dialogues, the licit and illicit shifts from one type to the other, and the rules for the embedding of dialogues of one type within those of another; it will also deal with the various degrees of rhetoricity in persuasion dialogues and of dialecticity in persuasive speeches and with the shifts between these various types of speech event as well as with their mutual embeddings. Equipped with such a theory we may safely venture once more into the house of Callias.

References


\textsuperscript{19} Such a speech, embedded in an explicit discussion, can again be analyzed as an implicit discussion. Cf. Van Eemeren and Grootendorst (1992, 43).

\textsuperscript{20} Elsewhere, I argued that much of what Van Eemeren and Houtlosser present as rhetorical behavior is more adequately designated as dialectical behavior (Krabbe, 2002). This does not detract from the importance of their analyses.


Van Eemeren, see: Eemeren, F. H. van.