

Rob van Gerwen, Dept. of Philosophy, Utrecht University

1. INTRODUCTION

To those who know the original performance by Jimi Hendrix of “Little Wing” Stevie Ray Vaughan’s cover may at first sound like a fraud.¹ Vaughan is playing a Jimi original in a Jimi-like manner, and this is, simply, ‘not done’. Now why would we want to regard this performance of “Little Wing” inauthentic? Surely, melodies are there to be performed? Isn’t that why we put tunes in notation, why we describe *and* define them through a score?² In popular music the relation between what emanates from the mind of a tune’s composer and its performance is often much more intricate than is the case with most classical music. None of this belongs exclusively to pop music, though. However, it is more normal here than it is in classical music. This brings to mind a deep problem both in music aesthetics and in philosophy of art generally, concerning that which pleases directly in the senses: the phenomenal basis of aesthetic evaluation, as opposed to the structural, or formal (depending on one’s theoretical background) ontology of the work. In our preliminary disapproval of Vaughan’s “Little Wing”, however, we must be taking his performance as something quite different from a performance manifesting the structure or form of Jimi’s tune. In this piece of music we do not merely hear a performance of the *tune* of “Little Wing” but one in the very style of Jimi Hendrix. Now Hendrix is appreciated for his special treatment of the music and for his guitar playing—his perfect timing and the looseness of his interventions in the tune. So here we have one guitarist plagiarizing the other—or so the argument goes. To dismantle the argument one would have to establish whether the performance at issue is perhaps in Vaughan’s own style (or in no style at all). Indeed, as a better trained listening teaches us, Stevie Ray Vaughan *is* playing the tune in his own style.

2. ONTOLOGY IS WHAT PRODUCES THE ISSUE

Musicologists need not to have had much to say about the issue I want to raise here, because it is a philosophical one concerning a clash of the criteria that we use in various contexts for the identification of (musical) works of art. Individual style in music is what moves its listeners, and individual style is identified through the sounds that originate in the musician’s body’s movements. Individual style is what makes us first disapprove of Stevie Ray Vaughan’s version

¹ Stevie Ray Vaughan Little Wing. and Jimi Hendrix Little Wing.

² In his article for the Routledge Encyclopedia of Philosophy (forthcoming) Jerrold Levinson gives several definitions of music, depending on what else one wants to do with the definition and whether or not one wants to include more than just the overly musical. On 607 we read that “the most common approach of this kind [the attempt to characterize music intentionally] proposes simply that music is sounds made or arranged for aesthetic appreciation.” If you are interested in taking music as an art form (and I am) then this definition works well, Levinson says, but one might also want to include other recognizably musical events and devise a more inclusive notion of music, such as: “music is sounds humanly made or arranged for the purpose of enriching experience via active engagement [...] with the sounds regarded primarily as sounds.” (607). Levinson appreciates this conception’s power to include Cage’s 4’33”. I think, however, that we need a specifiable connection between the sounds and the human mind that starts the causal chain which leads to the sounds. I am headed in that different direction.

of “Little Wing”, and, in second instance, approve of it. However, a musical work, we are told over and over, is identified on a structural level, i.e. through the score. Nelson Goodman thinks that a musical work equals all the performances that comply with a score. Without notation we would have no means to stop Stravinsky’s “Firebird” from metamorphizing into Beethoven’s “Fifth”, through a sequence of slightly defective performances. If this ontology were exhaustive the issue I raise here could not be raised. In the context of the critical evaluation of music one identifies works mostly as the sounding event or the inherent aesthetic value of a performance. The aesthetic value of the composition as notated in the score normally is not at stake; and when we do take the composition as the subject of aesthetic evaluation we mostly treat it as a dispositional for generating good performances. So the question is: are we to identify a musical work through its score or through its performance? It seems to me that we have inherited our predicament from Kant and Kant-minded philosophers like Goodman in *Languages of Art*—or, more recently: Roger Scruton in his *The Aesthetics of Music* (Oxford U.P., 1997).³ I will first sketch Goodman’s ontology of the work and establish in what sense it might be seen as Kantian, then I will sketch Scruton’s ontology of sound and tone and what Kant has to say about what pleases in the senses, after which I will proceed to passages in Kant that hold a different thesis, which I will expound via Wollheim’s notion of individual style, thus returning to our initial issue.

Goodman’s theory of music’s identity is based on the impossibility of musical forgery, and on an elaborate semiotic analysis of the symbol system of music notation. Why is it that we cannot possibly forge Beethoven’s Fifth symphony, if a Rembrandt self-portrait can be forged by re-painting it on a different canvas and presenting it as an original Rembrandt painting? Music cannot be forged in this way—and this is not merely due to the respective contexts, rather the other way around: the contexts depend on the respective measures of forgeability of the arts that they surround. But what exactly is being forged in the case of painting? It is not merely its paraphraseable content or the objectively identifiable dots of paints on the canvass. A successful forgery of a painting involves a copying of its aesthetic merits as well: the individual style of the painter as much as the material aspects of the work. The difference between painting and music Goodman identified as that between autographic arts such as painting, where the ‘author’ of the work is the same person as the one who produces its material appearance; and allographic arts such as etching and music, where the material appearance is produced by another person or other persons than the person who conceived of the work: who composed or etched it. Mere allography does not in itself pose a guarantee against forgery, but allography together with a rigid system of identification does. The symbol system we use for writing scores is such a rigid system of identification. The signs that are used in it define one-to-one the elements of the performance. We can perform a score and notate that performance in a score which will by definition be identical to the original one.

³³ Scruton *The Aesthetics of Music* We should have paid more attention to Paul Crowther, another Kant-minded philosopher, esp. in Crowther “Creativity and Originality in Art”, reprinted with adjustments as the last chapter of Crowther *Art and Embodiment. From Aesthetics to Self-Consciousness*.

In Goodman's view notation is what makes the score definitive, not the (linguistic) signs on scores which specify the expressive qualities with which the composer wants the performers to perform his music while they do not conform to the demands of notationality of defining one-to-one their referents. Surprisingly, Goodman thinks suggestions made for purposes of expression do not belong to the identity of the work, because they fail to identify their referent in a rigid manner. Goodman thinks it is notationality's biggest merit to have emancipated music from forgery, and we can see what he means by that. But at what price has music been thus emancipated?

One of the curiosities Goodman has produced is: why would one want to make several versions, several performances, if score compliance makes the identity of a musical work? Surely we could simply produce the one perfectly complying performance, so why don't we? We could have a computer perform our scores and thus solve all ontological problems. Why not? Obviously, performing a work ever anew is motivated by considerations of aesthetic appreciation and aesthetic value.⁴ Performers who want merely to comply with the score resemble artists who use their art merely to convey ideas that are fully conceived beforehand, like, for instance, a René Magritte who most of the time used his painterly techniques to produce as 'transparent' a picture as possible in order to merely convey the idea. Painters like Rembrandt, Bacon, or Freud, on the contrary, direct our attention as much to the paint on their canvasses as to their subject matter—a phenomenon Wollheim aptly calls painting's 'twofoldness'.⁵ Jazz breeds musicians who tend to be more interested in improvisation than in achieving score compliance, and in improvisation we are as much concerned with structural properties of the music as with the way it sounds. Wollheim's notion of twofoldness transposed to music would be the listener's doubled-up attention to score *and* performance.⁶

What about the elements that pertain to performances but cannot be put in notation and do not, therefore, pertain to the score or, for that matter, to the work's identity, such as their expressiveness and the individual style the performance is in? Timing, to pick one of these excluded aspects of music, is of the utmost importance for a performance to *sound right*, it is what makes jazz swing, and it is irreducible to melody or rhythm. Instead, timing concerns the exact moment in which the musician begins and stops the notes she produces. Timing is about the attack and decay of

⁴ This is why we could write a history of performing practices. And through this historical survey we could get an overview over how people in different ages have enjoyed the music, not: how the sole correct performance ought to sound like.

⁵ In Wollheim "Seeing-As, Seeing-In, and Pictorial Representation", and elsewhere. Whether painting's twofoldness is merely a descriptive notion for Wollheim or whether it functions evaluatively remains to be established. My money is on the latter option.

⁶ Wollheim uses twofoldness to specify both the treatment of the work's material and its subject matter, and thus seems to reserve the term for representational pictures. We may of course wonder whether such a thing as musical representation is presupposed for there to exist a musical analogue to twofoldness, but I assume the problem of musical representation that the analogy seems to be neglecting can be circumvented. I will cursorily get back to this.

sounds: it is a bodily thing, and cannot be specified in the score.⁷ Goodman's stress on the ontology of allographic art forms such as music restricts even the questions that can be posed. Apparently, for Goodman, the artist's intentions, his individual style and the aesthetic value of music are in a wholly different league from the music's identity.⁸ As if they are not there to be heard as belonging to the music, but are to be taken as epiphenomena which must be correlated to the score.⁹ Goodman's reduction implies that a work's aesthetic nature does not belong to the work.

3. KANT ON THE FORMAL AND THE SENSUOUS

Paradoxically, Kant appears to have caused this very reduction by his insistence on the formal elements as the solely legitimate source for our judgements of taste. Kant is very explicit about excluding what is not formal in our appreciation of art, for instance in section 14 of the Critique of Judgement (henceforth cited as CJ), where he elucidates with examples why "A Pure Judgement of Taste is Independent of Charm and Emotion".¹⁰ In this section Kant says:

"The charm of colors or of the agreeable tone of an instrument may be added, but it is the design in the first case and the composition in the second that constitute the proper object of a pure judgement of taste." (CJ, Pluhar 72, B 225).

And he adds:

"[...] all they do is to make the form intuitable more precisely, determinately, and completely, while they also enliven the presentation¹¹ by means of their charm, by arousing and sustaining the attention we direct toward the object itself."

Kant goes on by saying similar things against the implication of the frame or of ornaments that do not inherently belong to the picture,¹² but I am more interested in Kant's remarks on charm, on what pleases directly in the senses, and more importantly, in his arguments for denying the relevance of these 'things' to the judgement of taste. Compare the next passage where Kant alleges that one who is interested in the agreeable lacks an interest in the true nature of objects.

"What is agreeable in the liveliest way requires no judgement at all about the character of the object, as we can see in people who aim at nothing but enjoyment [...]; they like to dispense with all judging." (CJ §3:4, Pluhar 48; B207).

So enjoying what is agreeable to us has no ground in our judgement of the agreeable object. If the judgement that one is 'having a good time' is based like this on a private feeling which is indiscriminate to details of the

⁷ David Pearce has argued that even Goodman's theory of expression as metaphorical exemplification is not going to reintroduce the expressive in music thus defined. (Pearce "Musical Expression: Some Remarks on Goodman's Theory.")

⁸ Goodman's extensionalist answer (Intentions? What are those?) is simply too good to be true.

⁹ Or, as Goodman has it: such things as these are exemplified by the work, either literally or metaphorically. In the absence of a satisfactory account of metaphorical exemplification or even of exemplification as such, this answer merely begs the question.

¹⁰ Kant *The Critique of Judgement*.

¹¹ Pluhar translates 'Vorstellung' with 'presentation', instead of 'representation'—a splendid move which prevents our comparing what happens in our mind to pictures and other representations: as things that are perceivable in their own right and which also have some subject matter elsewhere. This translation leaves it open for Kant to adopt a direct realist account of perception, instead of an indirect one.

¹² But remember Derrida's problematization of the internal-external opposition, in Derrida "Parergon".

object then it is germane to that person only:

"To one person the color violet is gentle and lovely, to another liveless and faded. One person loves the sound of wind instruments, another that of string instruments."¹³

Kant provides two arguments for expelling charm and what pleases directly in the senses, but they do not fit together well. The first argument is hardly more than a suggestion based on earlier sections. It says that finding a mere sensation agreeable is a *personal* thing dependent upon one's personal preferences, as a consequence of which it cannot lay claim to the universal agreement Kant rightly thinks we ascribe to our judgements of taste.¹⁴ However, the reason why this feeling might not rightly lay claim to universal agreement cannot lie in its being a feeling, as the judgement of beauty is based on a feeling as well. So the argument does not hold in itself. In comes the second argument: the phenomenal as such does not admit of communication. We cannot possibly explain to someone else how we perceive a specific colour or tone—we can only explain which role we think it is playing *within a series* of colours or tones. The problem Kant sees with what pleases directly in the senses does not concern a type of feeling—the agreeable—but an aspect of sensation, the phenomenal, the "what it is like to see a colour or hear a tone".

Kant too recognized the problems that he was faced with after distinguishing within our experience of music (or pictures) the phenomenality of tones (and colours) from their formal role. In section 51:10 he states that

"[...] we cannot say with certainty whether a color or a tone (sound) is merely an agreeable sensation or whether it is of itself already a beautiful play of [component] sensations and as such carries with it, as we judge it aesthetically, a liking for its form." (CJ, 51:10, Pluhar 194, B324).

Notwithstanding these impracticalities, however, Kant upholds his transcendental distinction. In section 39 he rehearses his argument against a colour's phenomenality being communicable, and right after that, in section 40, paragraphs 5 to 6, explains how taste (and fine art, I should add at this point) judges our capacity of empathizing with other people's mental life. He characterizes the aesthetic harmony of our cognitive faculties as follows:¹⁵

Only where the imagination is free when it arouses the understanding, and the understanding, without using concepts, puts the imagination into a play that is regular [...], does the presentation communicate itself not as a thought but as the inner feeling of a purposive state of mind. (CJ 40:5-6, Pluhar 162, B295-96).

The imagination must be free in its guidance of our experience if this experience is to result in an awareness of our mental life's being communicable:

Hence taste is our ability to judge a priori the communicability of the feelings that (without mediation by a concept) are connected with a given presentation. (CJ 40:5-6, Pluhar 162, B295-96).

This passage also presents Kant's explanation of the role and nature of 'sensus communis' in aesthetic judgement.

¹³ (CJ §7:1, Pluhar 55, B212). Kant might have put his remark in terms of judgements about universals as opposed to particulars (as he had the opportunity to do, in terms of his analysis in section 6, ff.). Liking a string quartet because it has strings in it involves an inference from a general classification. It is just plainly wrong to judge an instance of music on account merely of its belonging to a specific genre or kind. We have to hear the particular work for ourselves and cannot derive its beauty from any determinate concept.

¹⁴ Indeed, whenever someone disagrees with our judgement of taste we do not merely retreat beyond "well, at least I think it is beautiful".

¹⁵ In contrast with its—law-governed—cognitive counterpart, which occurs when we get to *know* something.

Kant thinks that our culture's motivation to sustain the domain of art is: to celebrate the communicability of mental life. The point I want to make here regards how Kant debased the phenomenal in favour of the reflective aspects of art appreciation. This should remind us of Goodman's elevation of score compliance at the expense of the aesthetics of the performed sound event.

4. SOUNDS' PHYSICAL ORIGINS IRRELEVANT?

Roger Scruton too ventilates ideas similar to Kant's on what does not belong in (the appreciation of) music: he emphasizes the intentional unity of the product of the composer's creativity, under the exclusion of the origins of the tones of music, but again, like Goodman, by doing ontology, not aesthetics. Scruton thinks that we report certain sounds in terms of their origins merely because we do not have the words to describe them as the phenomenal awarenesses of pitch that they are. These origins, for instance the instrument that produced the sound, do not belong to the sound—in fact they may be absent altogether: there is no contradiction involved in hearing the sound of a saxophone while no saxophone is anywhere near us. Putting the intentional unity of a work to the fore comes close to Kant's insistence on the formal role of sound and colour—and Scruton's ontology is an improvement. He does not debase the phenomenal but, instead, reduces its phenomenology. Scruton's phenomenology of sound perception, however, is rather poor. And this mars his theory. Scruton thinks that “we are not part of the world of sound as we are part of the visual world.” (Scruton, 13). This allegedly is so because sound is not in space like visual things are. I agree that sounds are not in space in quite that same way, but surely hearing the world helps in situating our body in it, so sounds could not *not* be in that same space where we perceivers are. Instead, it orders this space in ways different from how visual things order it. Scruton however, argues that the *origins* of sounds, the playing of instruments et cetera, which *are* visually there in space are not, therefore, relevant for our perceiving of sound which allegedly is *not* in space. However, the way our perceptual concepts are built into our perceptual experiences gives more momentum to claiming that when we hear a sound we normally hear it as originating in certain ways and this illustrates the very richness of the phenomenology of perception. Autist perception seems to be the paradigm case for Scruton: certain autists are capable to hear the sounds but cannot hear them as originating in certain events—hence their disorientation and, sometimes, rage. Scruton is cutting music off from the bodily origins of its sounds in favour of its inherent intentional coherence, which coherence originates in the creativity of the composer. Making aesthetic value fully inhere this intentional coherence of a work puts all the stress on the composing as opposed to the performing of music.

5. REINTRODUCING THE PERFORMER

But there are positive reasons for reversing this hierarchy and for stating the relevance for the aesthetic value and identity of a musical work, of the acts of performing which cause the sounds. Timbre, sound colour, and timing are of the essence for a musical work's aesthetic success and if

they are not traced back to their assumed bodily origins music loses one important means of signification. It will then lose the very means to ‘celebrate’ what Kant calls ‘the communicability of feeling’.¹⁶ For instance, the sounds of a soprano saxophone differ from those of a tenor in that sopranos will normally produce a higher pitch than tenors. But they also admit of distinct ranges of timing, because the keys of the instruments must be handled in different ways. The tenor player may need more power in his fingers to move the keys, whereas the soprano player may need more speed. Then the players will have different respiration characteristics: to produce a tone on a tenor sax requires more breath than producing the ‘same’ one with a soprano saxophone does. Saxophonists mostly specialize on one instrument, or, if they don’t, they sometimes just *sound better* on one of the instruments they play, at the expense of the others. I am not saying that no tone on a tenor sax can possibly be produced with a soprano. What I am saying is that the material characteristics of each of these instruments calls for bodily characteristics on behalf of the instrumentalist. Certain timings, tones or sequences of tones sit better with one instrument than with the other and certain instruments sit better with one player than with another. One can compare the tenor playing of a Coleman Hawkins, Ben Webster, or Albert Ayler, with the soprano playing by Eric Dolphy, Anthony Braxton or Steve Lacy to actually hear such differences. Differences in sound quality presuppose different bodily characteristics. Of course, these limitations can be stretched—virtuoso has its own rewards, but that is not my point. My point is that these bodily differences form part of the characteristics of sound and can be *heard in* them.

Many aestheticians nowadays think of artistic meaning as originating in the critical perception of artistic *material*, leaving little room for a downright dismissal of certain aspects of the phenomenal such as is found in Scruton, or of the phenomenal tout court as we saw in Kant; or for turning it into a non-pertinent contingency as Goodman does. But are Scruton’s and Goodman’s overestimation of the intentional structure of the notable musical work really fully retraceable to Kant? Kant may have been guilty of not having formulated a fully elaborated philosophy of art, but he did say a few other things.

6. KANT ON STYLE (MANNER)

Kant’s theses concerning form and the phenomenal are framed by his discussion, in section 60, of the ‘method’ or ‘manner’ of the artist. And this discussion is as crucial to his philosophy of art as it is to my argument. Section 60, an appendix “On Methodology Concerning Taste”, concludes the aesthetic part of the CJ, so the discussion should be of moment for our interpretation of Kant’s aesthetics. Kant starts off by saying that there are no methods concerning fine art because there are no rules to be followed. Instead there is what he calls ‘manner’ (*modus*).

“the master must show by his example what the student is to produce and how.” (CJ 60:1, Pluhar 230-31, B355).

The master may put down rules or teach techniques but these are to function only as reminders not as constraints for the

¹⁶ CJ, section 40.

artist-to-be. Master and student must work toward an ideal—I assume Kant refers here to the ideal of beauty (§17), which it would take too much time now to deal with. The master must criticize the student whenever his aesthetic idea does not reach its aims. And he must motivate the student’s imagination:

“only in this way can the master keep the student from immediately treating the examples offered him as if they were archetypes, models that he should imitate as if they were not subject to a still higher standard and to his own judgement.” (CJ 60:1, Pluhar 231, B355).

I want to make two remarks about this: first, the way the master can teach his student is by making exemplary art himself, by putting the paint onto the canvas and showing how specific bodily actions conform to the aesthetic idea he has in mind, how they make this idea communicable. Secondly, Kant thinks that the propedeutic to this master-student situation lies in studying humaniora, and this would be so because all art is about the communicability of human mental life.

7. WOLLHEIM’S INDIVIDUAL STYLE

Kant’s remarks on manner or method prefigure Wollheim’s notion of ‘individual style’. According to Richard Wollheim individual style, first, is a prerequisite for aesthetic interest, in that without it we cannot hope to fully fathom a piece of art. Secondly, it is a prerequisite for artistic expression, and lastly, individual style has psychological reality.¹⁷ Wollheim argues for this position by comparing two strategies an art historian can choose from to describe a body of works. He can take style-description as a matter of classification and sum up which traits one finds important, or distinctive in a body of work as opposed to other bodies of work: this strategy Wollheim calls taxonomic. The second strategy is generative: it describes the painter’s way of handling the paint and orders the works along lines deriving from that. This strategy starts from and gives insight into the psychology of the artist’s handling.

What goes into an individual style are specifications of, among others, “line, hue, tonality, firmness of line, saturation of colour”, and “those schemata—a mixed bag—which refer to the condition of the support or to the use of the medium: edge, brushstroke, scumbling”. I will leave Wollheim’s subtle elaborations for another occasion, nor am I going to repeat Wollheim’s arguments against the taxonomic approach, because they in part repeat what I meant to bring up against Goodman’s reductionist ontology. I will simply try to have the criteria that are involved in the generative approach motivate the approach to music that I am proposing here.

For this, Wollheim’s third characteristic of individual style needs spelling out though: its psychological reality. An artist’s individual style, if he has one, he will have formed it, instead of merely acquired it. If one wants to describe an individual style, one must take recourse to psychological factors that have motivated the artist to develop it, since specific considerations in the artist’s mind will have corresponded to specific material interventions in the chosen artistic material, which resulted in specific traits in his works. To supplant this model on to music—Wollheim devised it for

¹⁷ “Pictorial Style: Two Views.”, in Wollheim *The Mind and its Depths*, 171-84.

painting—one has to make sure to start from the right distinctions, not the ones Goodman and Scruton introduce. Since painting is autographic individual style can be derived from the *products* of the *acts of painting* as delivered by the person who *conceived* of the work, who within painting mostly is one and the same person. With music, an allographic art, one has to decide which traits in the resultant performance derive from the creative mind that conceived of the work, the composer, and which derive from the actions producing the sounds of the performers. We cannot simply skip the input of the performers in order to evaluate or describe the art of the composer. The individual style of a composer would be something rather abstract, based on analyses exclusively of the scores the composer has produced, without the possibility of taking recourse to how the music sounds—or one might want to describe the composer’s individual style on account of how a computer-performance sounds, including only those elements that can be notated in Goodman’s sense. The individual style of the performer, however, *will* be made up both of his mental and bodily actions. The psychological reality both of music and of individual style in music go back to the performer’s material manipulations.

Where does this leave us with regard to the ontological identification of the musical work of art? Well, Goodman thought that it was the score that emancipated music from forgery, but the very same symbol system of notation put music in a straitjacket. Indeed, music thus conceived of is allographic. But the ‘allo’ that is doing the ‘graphein’—the performing musician—reintroduces the possibilities of forgery and plagiarizing. CD-reproduction attests to the uniqueness of the various performances of one single work. You do not listen to “Bach’s Goldberg Variations”, but to either Gould’s or Tureck’s or whoever’s “performance of Bach’s Goldberg Variations”. There is no aesthetic sense to forging a CD reproduction because CDs are connected causally to the performance they reproduce—not via a symbol system such as notation. However, it does make sense to think that the individual style of a performance can be forged. Thus, CD reproduction has emancipated the performance of music from its score and made it aesthetically available again.

8. MUSICAL PRESENTATION

Now what role is being played by a performer within that intentional structure that a musical work consists in? Is she *represented* in the music? Or is the music the *expression* of her mental life?¹⁸ Or does she play yet another role in whatever is expressed or represented in the work? I am not interested here in the grander issue of finding out whether or not we can take music as representational. And I am particularly uninterested in finding any conventionalist varieties of musical representation: of course, one can devise a set of conventions that relegates specific meanings to specific combinations of sounds. Big deal. We have had a conventionalist system of pictorial representation in the Middle Ages. Indeed, we can make anything whatsoever to mean anything we like.

¹⁸ No, but the intimacy effects of the performing inform (guide, determine, fill in, make possible) the expression of the experiential aspects of the persona.

But we cannot just make anything to represent naturally—that is, in ways that presuppose nothing beyond our natural powers of perceptual recognition. What would we a naturalist variety of musical representation be like? We could not make a specific sound to represent another specific sound in any way analogous to the brown-yellowish depiction that makes us see the gold of a painted golden calf.¹⁹ How should we go about if we'd want to musically represent a cow-bell? The easiest thing to do was to take a cow-bell and have it rung. But we would not then have represented a cow-bell, but have *presented* an *instance* of the kind of sounds cow-bells produce. The problem is—and I am not saying it is unsurmountable—that there is no secured reduction of dimensions from the real world to its musical representation, as there is with depiction, which goes from three to two dimensions. The relative poverty of music's representational powers derives from the fact that the spatial dimensions of musical sound are identical to those of real-life (represented) sound. This explains why repeating real-life sounds or changing them just a little to give it a musical ring seems so uninteresting most of the time. We may use the drums to convey the shooting of guns, or compose tunes resembling the whistling of birds, or just record the sounds of people passing by, but most music has little use for such devices. Yet we do not seem to use music to represent the world in conventional manners either. Our interest in music must lie in a different region. We now enter the conceptual mine-field of musical expression.

9. THE PERFORMER'S PERSONA

Musical meaning can come about by way of the intentional structure of the music—which is more or less the point of view of tradition, including Goodman and Scruton, or by literally presenting real-life sound instances, which no-one seems to defend as an interesting paradigm case. But the intentional structure of a work of music is not a floating raft with no extra-musical connections to the world. In it we find symptoms of the handling of the sound material by the performers. This causal impact of a performer's psychology and her individual style, form a third way of generating musical meaning. The attribution of Wollheimian individual style to a music performer seems a natural thing to do, because the performance, the musicians' actual making of the music is contemporaneous to its sounding as well as causally connected to it. Thus, we can hear the presence of the performer in the production of the sounds as an aspect of the sounds. The wealthy phenomenology of our hearing will suggest the bodily origins of the sounds, thus introducing us to an implied performer: someone who is listening to the music and actively engaging with it: this performer introduces real psychology into the music, not just a fake narrative that must be supplied in the liner notes to the work. This real psychology informs the listener's feeling for the persona, who according to aestheticians like Jerrold Levinson, forms the organizing principle of musical expression.²⁰ It is like this that we evaluate popular and jazz music in the first place: by listening to how the music is performed. A good example of the

¹⁹ The example is from Michael Podro "Depiction and the Golden Calf". There seem to be no means to translate a combination of sounds into a wholly different set of sounds: the booing of cows into the whistling of a bird, for instance.

²⁰ Levinson "Musical Expressiveness".

performer's presence in the intentional sound structure of a tune enlivening the expression of the sound event is Ayler's rendition of Gershwin's "Summertime".²¹ We hear an expressive piece of music, and the performer in it. We 'hear' his fingers moving, his respiration, his choices of timing—and all this in Ayler's distinctive pre-free individual style.²² This Kant saw correctly: art celebrates the communicability of mental life.

This is not just a popular music thing. John Cage's aleamorphic music leaves most responsibility regarding the intentional structure of 'his' music to its performers.²³ The quest for authenticity in Baroque music is a further instance of the recognition of the performance's aesthetic primacy over the score. We cannot normally make sense of the differences between two performances merely by looking at the score. What is different between them will pertain to timing and timbre, to the way the pieces sound, and to how they connect up with their (implied) performers. The reasons we are willing to provide for preferring one performance over another have no primary bearing on the composer of the work, but on its performers. This is the one major lesson to be drawn from popular and jazz music. And it is the development of recording devices such as the CD, that has taken care of this emancipation of music from its score. Music lovers have known this all along, but music aestheticians must have it spelled out: music *can* be forged. It *is* autographic, even when scored. And there is no other way to make sense of it than through what pleases in the senses.²⁴

²¹ Ayler "Summertime".

²² Ayler can be heard to be in transition to his free style on Ayler *The First Recordings*.

²³ Cf. Tormey "Indeterminacy and Identity in Art."

²⁴ I thank my aesthetics students and the audience of the conference "The Kantian Turn", at the Jan van Eyck-Academy, Maastricht, for critical remarks, esp. Bas Hagemeyer and Edward Winters.

REFERENCES

- Ayler, A. (1990 (1969)) *The First Recordings*. Sonet Records SNTCD 604.
- Ayler, A. (1995 (1963)) "Summertime". *My Name is Albert Ayler*. Recorded in Copenhagen, Black Lion (BLCD 760211),
- Crowther, P. (1991) "Creativity and Originality in Art". *British Journal of Aesthetics*, **31**, 301-309.
- Crowther, P. (1993) *Art and Embodiment. From Aesthetics to Self-Consciousness*. Oxford, Clarendon Press.
- Derrida, J. (1978) "Parergon". *La vérité en peinture*. Paris, Flammarion,
- Hendrix, J. (1967) "Little Wing", *Axis: Bold as Love*.
- Kant, I. (1987 (1790)) *The Critique of Judgement*. Indianapolis, Cambridge, Hackett Publishing Company (tr. Werner S. Pluhar).
- Levinson, J. (1996) "Musical Expressiveness". *The Pleasures of Aesthetics*. Ithaca and London, Cornell University Press, 90-128.
- Pearce, D. (1988) "Musical Expression: Some Remarks on Goodman's Theory." *In: Essays on the Philosophy of Music. Acta Philosophica Fennica*, **43**, p. 228-243. (E.Rantala, L. Rowell, E. Tarasti, eds., 1988) Helsinki.
- Podro, M. (1987) "Depiction and the Golden Calf". Harrison, A., Ed. *Philosophy and the Visual Arts*. Dordrecht, Kluwer, 3-22.
- Scruton, R. (1997) *The Aesthetics of Music*. Oxford, Clarendon Press.
- Tormey, A. (1974) "Indeterminacy and Identity in Art." *Monist*, **58**, p.205-15.
- Vaughan, S.R. "Little Wing", *The Sky is Crying*.
- Wollheim, R. (1980) "Seeing-As, Seeing-In, and Pictorial Representation". *Art and its Objects. Second Edition*. Cambridge, Cambridge University Press., 205-226.
- Wollheim, R. (1993) *The Mind and its Depths*. Cambridge (Mass.), London (England), Harvard University Press.