From:

Rob van Gerwen (ed.): Richard Wollheim on the Art of Painting. Art as Representation and Expression.

Chapter 10
Expression as Representation
Rob van Gerwen

According to Richard Wollheim, three ways of seeing are involved in beholding a painting—i.e. seeing-in, expressive perception, and the capacity to experience perceptual delight (PA 45)—and the painter relies on the beholder to use them in appreciating his paintings. Only the first two ways are relevant to my argument. Seeing-in is the kind of perception adequate to representations of external objects. It is characterized by a specific phenomenology, that is, twofoldness: we see something in a marked surface.1 Expressive perception is adequate to a painting’s expression of mental or internal phenomena;2 it involves correspondence “[…] between some part of the external world—a scene—and an emotion of ours which the scene is capable of invoking in virtue of how it looks”, and projection, “[…] a process in which emotions or feelings flow from us to what we perceive” (PA 82). Do these distinctions capture sufficiently the differences and similarities between representation and expression? In what follows I develop a theory of expression’s connectedness with representation, and divert from Wollheim’s subtle considerations. My most crucial departure from Wollheim’s point of view lies in my characterization of the way in which representations address our senses, and my insistence that expression follow suit in this type of addressing us (instead of demanding a distinctly projective mode of perception). Wollheim thinks we can see events in a painting that have preceded what is visible in it, but that we have to project its melancholy expression.3 It seems to me, however, that in both cases an act of imagination is needed. My argument will start from stock approaches to expression, and via an account of (naturalist) types of representation such as depiction, go on to an account of expression in terms of that account of representation.

Before all this, let us start with an intuitive grasp of the distinction between representation and expression. The words 'happy' and 'desolate' obviously mean different things; in a way, their meanings are even opposed. This conflict of meaning, however, need not be an extensional conflict. When looking at a picture of happy people dancing in the streets, we may yet find the picture expressive of desolation without contradicting ourselves and this may all
pertain to the depicted events. The meanings of the two terms
(taken intensionally) may conflict, even while applying to the same extension: happiness may come qualified. Were we to think that the relevant terms are only applicable disjointedly, then one of our attributions would be inadequate: the dance would have to be either desolate or happy; it could not be both. This, however, is not what we have in mind when we find this happy dancing desolate. Applying ‘conflicting’ terms to a single scene shows how complicated the task of understanding an event’s expression can be, but does it prove that the applications of the two terms are different in kind? If we had a single term with which to describe the desolate variety of happiness, we might want to apply it.

The expressions involved in this example are of two types: the natural type, regarding the happiness in the faces and gestures of the dancing persons, where there is a direct causal connection between the expression and the mental events expressed—albeit that, here, this natural expression is depicted. The other type might be thought of as an environmental variety, which is at least a less straightforward and more complicated type of expression than its natural counterpart, but also one which introduces a wider set of circumstantial evidence, including thoughts and beliefs about events which may or may not in actuality be available to the dancing people—such as facts about the city’s recent earthquake. Even though we may have to produce distinct accounts for these two types of expression, my point is that they are connected and mutually qualifying. They may differ in grade, but not in essence. I am not neglecting the fact that my example involves a picture rather than its real-life counterpart. In fact, my point is that artistic expression, like the environmental type of expression, must be understood as a qualifier of what is depicted, and, therefore, as a representational means.

1. The Opposition Argument

According to what I take to be the best argument for opposing artistic expression to artistic representation, it is conceptually feasible to understand a painting which depicts happily dancing individuals as portraying the events in a desolate manner. Conceptually speaking, it seems all right to say that the mental or experiential dimensions of a painting’s representation (its image, I mean) and its expression are of disagreeing nature, not only intensionally but even extensionally—if this
distinction is available to one.⁵ And this is so, supposedly, because expression is an aspect of the way the material of the work has been organized, whereas the subject represented in the image stands on its own—beyond the painted canvas, so to speak, in a distinct space—as do the experiences of its antagonists. Let us look at a classical example of the opposition argument. Nelson Goodman thinks that artistic expression is sufficiently characterized by taking it as metaphorical exemplification; whether or not the metaphor in question is a psychological term is irrelevant, because expression is psychological by contingency only.⁶ Goodman sees exemplification as a reference relation opposed to that of representation and, therefore, expression too is opposed to representation. I am unsure whether I understand this correctly, but if I do, I think it is not a viable position. According to Goodman, if you say that a work which expresses x-ness is x, then you are making a true assertion, since the work really possesses x-ness, albeit metaphorically. In part, this means that the expression of a work is not in the artist’s control as much as its representation is.⁷ Such difference in control is, however, at best a gradual matter. The representational and expressive effects of an artist’s intervention may very well be effected by one and the same intervention. Wollheim’s concept of ‘twofoldness’ explains why a beholder sees represented depth in flat marks on the surface while empathizing with the way the artist put those marks there.⁸ Therefore, we must consider our responses to a represented face and its natural expression—as represented to be based on how the painted marks are placed on the canvas, as much as are our responses to the (artistic) expression with which this face is presented to us. The effort of materially marking off the expression and the representation within some single picture is wasted. So how can it not be wasteful to philosophically oppose the two? The reason the artist is less in charge of the expression of her work than she is of its representation is connected with the peculiar way in which both are recognized by the beholder. To understand why the recognition of expression should be ‘peculiar’ we need a psychological account—one Goodman has not provided, but Wollheim has.

The most notable of Goodman’s problems in the area of expression is his inability to explain why we tend to use psychological terms to describe what is expressed—a fact he acknowledges but dismisses as inessential. Expression terms supposedly are metaphors, and that is all there is to them. Well, let us suppose that we take a sad painting as a
metaphorical exemplification—a metaphorical example—of sadness. How can this painting make us want to apply the terms ‘is sad’? What metaphorical clues would be needed? I cannot think of any. What if we took the clues—if any were found—as literally applicable, and forgot all about metaphor? How could Goodman retort? He seems merely to repeat the mystery he set out to solve. The opposition between representation and expression is conceptual only. However, it is language ‘gone on holiday’. It has no basis in the critical appraisal of works of art.

Like he did with representational seeing, in his later account of expressive seeing Wollheim refers to a psychological phenomenon we are already acquainted with in more ordinary circumstances. The projection that Wollheim thinks is involved in our recognition of expression both in nature and in art stems from ways in which we have taught ourselves to handle our more negative emotions. To get rid of the fears that, for instance, we feel for a certain person, we project the fear onto him. In infancy our projections often are plainly wrong, but when growing up they tend to become more and more appropriate to the other’s objectives and expression. We no longer simply, project our own state of mind onto the other, but, more complexly, ascertain the other’s state as akin to ours. We take more care to verify our projections. The crucial question in the present context, of course, is How do we ascertain the appropriateness of a complex projection of melancholy on to a natural scene or a painting, which clearly aren’t sentient? According to Wollheim our relevant experience of the expressive thing or scene shows an affinity with previous similar experiences that involved melancholy. As Wollheim puts it, “When a fearful object strikes fear into an observer, as it does, it is not solely fear of that object. On the other hand, the experience reveals or intimates a history.” (CPE, 149). This account, subtle though it is, risks explaining expression as an experience of comparing a present perception with a set of previous ones—which falls victim to the argument which Wollheim himself developed, in chapter 1 above, against the similarity accounts of depiction of Budd and Peacocke. Rather than explaining expression in terms of a comparison with something absent Wollheim should be held to insist on its perceptual nature. We perceive the expression of a work to pertain to the work, and to be part of it.

The positive side to the ‘opposition’ argument is that it recognizes that artistic expression differs from the natural expression of real-life persons. However, it construes this difference wrongly. According to the opposition argument, depicted natural expression issues
from within the depicted character, whereas artistic expression—being the expression pertaining to the work—issues from without, i.e. from the hands and mind of the artist. Both in the production of a work of art and according to its appreciation, however, representation and expression issue from a single source: the artist’s hands.\textsuperscript{10} The difference between artistic and real-life natural expression lies in the absence, or, respectively, presence of the mental life that is expressed, but this distinction is unavailable with depicted natural expression. Due to this complication, artistic expression may need a different account, such as the following, which takes it as the expression of an (implied) ‘persona’.

2. Persona Accounts

Bruce Vermazen, Stephen Davies and Jerrold Levinson, to name only a few, think that in understanding artistic expression we empathize with a persona in the work. This seems to be a plausible alternative to the complex notion of an ‘affinity’, which Wollheim (in PA 87 and CPE 152) places at the base of the correspondence between the expressive perception and its object.\textsuperscript{11} The persona account allows us to group together the expressive elements in a work as resembling the natural expression of real persons (the mental life inherent in personhood being part of what ‘personas’ have), while at the same time leaping out of the way of intentional fallacies by avoiding the identification of personas with real people, such as actors or authors.\textsuperscript{12} We obviously sometimes empathize with personas in a work (e.g. with the characters played by actors), but how? And how do we do it where no explicit psychological narrative is involved, as in music? What—apart from the intuitions concerning a suitable persona that the expression of the music induces us to develop—introduces the persona to which the expressive elements are supposed to belong? It is as though iron filings, merely on account of our taking them as ordered by some specific magnet, will provide the description of a magnet. Up to a certain point, this may work if the filings are neatly laid out in a regular pattern, but if they aren’t, why would one introduce a magnet as the ordering principle? Two answers are available. First, when introducing a persona (an implied magnet) we do not introduce full-fledged psychologies, but merely parts of a psyche, i.e. those parts that correspond to what is expressed in the music. This answer takes us back to square one. The second answer is that introducing a
persona is explanatory efficient. It structures the work in a meaningful way: elements will start falling into their right places. We need to find out what makes these ‘places’ seem the right ones. Understanding problematic cases of artistic expression (such as musical expression) as a variety of character identification is a great step in what I think is the right direction, i.e. taking expression as a kind of representation of the mental. However, as long as we have an insufficient grasp of how we recognize the mental events of (fictional, represented) personas, we seem to have gained too little. Reversely, an adequate understanding of our understanding of characters’ mental lives may give us the glue to stick the persona account onto the problematic cases. We should develop the analogy between natural and artistic expression by making a comparison between expression and representation, and finding an alternative to opposing the two. Personas do not have real minds, and here philosophy is in need of some ontology of personas. I submit that the persona of some artistic expression is a product of the beholder’s imagination which his imagination is induced to produce by ‘empty spots’ in the work of art, and in the production of which it is guided by what is there to be perceived in the work (a tertiary quality, brought into existence by the work’s secondary qualities). This goes for understanding the character played by an actor or empathizing with his mental life, as well as for the harder cases of musical expressiveness. Stressing the constitutive role of the imagination helps us to see that expression is a disposition in the work to make a suitably equipped beholder procure an empathetic response. The matter of the absence of the mental from a work of art is my first argument for the position that artistic expression is an instance of representation. The mental is represented; some of its clues are there, but it (the mental) is not.

If a screenwriter wants a character to pick up a book, the script will tell the actor to pick up a book. The audience will see the character pick up the book. Greg Currie argues that the audience sees the actor, not the character, because characters do not have secondary qualities, but this is puzzling, since visually there is symmetry between what the actor can be seen to be doing and what the audience is supposed to imagine the character is doing. We will not imagine the character to be bending in a different direction, or to be wearing a jacket that is different from the one the actor is wearing. We do, however, find an asymmetry between the mental lives involved. There is no need for the actor to feel bad whenever the script instructs him to act as though his
character is in grief. If the audience is to imagine that the character is in grief, all the actor has to do is perform the external expressions he and the audience think accompany grief. He must present the clues, not the mental life itself. This asymmetry is instructive for us, because artistic expression is more fruitfully compared to represented natural expression (the clues of the mental performed by the actor) than to real-life natural expression. Taking the treatment of the material as one’s clue for artistic expression and understanding it as a natural expression of the artist, may seem a comprehensible enough next step to take in the case of painting, but it hardly is in the case of film. It is, however, in the case of film that things may become clearer. In the absence of the mental life as it is conveyed by a work, comparing artistic expression to natural expression by taking the work as an extension or symptom of the artist’s mind, seems overstating the artist’s intentionality. Instead, I treat it as functioning representationally. The relevant model for artistic expression is the representation of natural expression.

3. A Definition of Representation (its Naturalist Types)

To do that, however, some helpful definition of representation is wanted, i.e. a definition which is successful in both the visual and the psychological regions of painting. I propose the following definition of naturalist types of representation, such as depictions. I take these naturalist types as basic, and my approach may tell you why. This is my definition of *representation*:

> "Something which is perceived egocentrically is a representation of the naturalist type if and only if it while being perceived non-egocentrically, causes us to anticipate (in a postulatable world) the homomodal recurrence of some of the thing's properties."

This definition attributes two characteristics. Representation involves, firstly, an anticipated homomodal recurrence, and secondly, non-egocentricity (not in the psycho-moral sense of selfishness, but in the phenomenological sense of centrally involving the body of perception). The perception of everyday life events, and of the thing hanging on the museum’s wall (the painting), is relative to the position of one’s body; it is, therefore, egocentric. However, the perception of a painting as an object of interpretation is not: art appreciation is non-
egocentric. The term is Greg Currie’s. Although we can perceive non-egocentrically anything whatsoever, such as a chair’s form, only in the case of representations are we intentionally induced to do so and to anticipate that certain of the properties perceived will recur in a different space and time. Such anticipation is homomodal if and only if it involves the exact same senses that would be needed to recognize the relevant properties in real life (or imagination). In depiction, both are visual. Sounds or smells cannot be represented pictorially. Cross-modal representation involves non-naturalist, conventional types of symbol, such as description, most notably, but this is not my subject here. As to the recurrence involved in representation, I use this term in combination with ‘anticipation’ to replace ‘resemblance’, in order to stress its psychology rather than its ontology. The ‘recurrence’ need not be actual as long as we imagine it to appear. The anticipation is meant ‘as such’, i.e. without the need for its satisfaction. This meets Wollheim’s minimal requirement and acknowledges the perceptual nature of representation. (See chapter 1, this volume) It is also an alternative to saying that all that is needed to account for our understanding of pictures are our natural powers of perceptual recognition—as Greg Currie does (IM, 85 ff.). To account for representational recognition there is no need to answer questions about whether or not the image in the picture tracks the depicted—which will either be past or fictional—as it really is or has been, and whether our anticipation regards such tracking as causal (as in photography) or intentional (as in painting). Goodman was right about the ontological problems connected with (actual) resemblance, but wrong, again, by seeing the role of resemblance exclusively from an epistemological angle, neglecting its psychological—i.e. anticipated—nature. We are not looking primarily for actual similarities in our appreciation of pictures; instead, we are confident that it is resemblances that are at stake. Expecting certain properties of a work to be recurrent from ‘elsewhere’ is more definitive of depiction than assessing the actuality of such recurrence is. Obviously, such anticipation is the achievement of the beholder. An adequate approach to artistic representation should be psychological. If there happens to be an actual pictorial reference, then anticipation of recurrences is its psychological—i.e. naturalistic—prerequisite. Further to this, seeing things in the picture, in Wollheim’s terms, presupposes our taking the thing on the wall as a picture; it presupposes our anticipating certain modalities of
recurrence, the presupposition of which is of a general nature. Proposing the anticipation of kinds of recurrence as an explanans to seeing-in allows one to distinguish between kinds of ‘seeing-in’. Wollheim’s term is indiscriminate as to the sense modality that is addressed when something is ‘seen in’ something. The paradigm case of seeing-in is the camel in the clouds. (Here the use of an optical term is unproblematic, but are there analogies for the other senses?) According to Wollheim, we can, for instance, see events happening in a still picture. I see why this proves the advantage of the seeing-in account over the seeing-as-account, but Wollheim’s stretching of vision to imply elements that are not visually there I find unproblematic. Wollheim however, prefers the stretching over allowing imagination a role in perception—he conceives of imagination as fantasy. I, instead, view fantasy as a subfunction of imagination, and imagination, the genus cognitive function, as a faculty operative within perception. Wollheim has to make sense of the point at which to stop implying what is visible in a painting even though it is not visually there. In the example he elaborates in chapter 1, above, he seems to locate this stopping point in some or other intuition (and see my note 3). The challenge to my alternative—which explains how imagination is being activated by what is perceptually available—is how to make clear what our imagination is supposed to be introducing. Wollheim does not need to think my proposal to be an advance on his theory because it may seem to separate perceptual functions which he thinks cannot be separated, i.e. vision and imagination, but I will show how in the end my distinction does provide an advance, and why these separations have to be made in order to make sense of kinds of expression in art forms that involve other sense modalities.

4. Twofoldness and Non-Egocentricity

It may be obvious to us that, for instance, watching a film involves our eyes and ears only (apart from our imagination) and that nothing happening in the film can physically affect our bodies; but it was not at all obvious to those first film-goers who fled the auditorium in Paris thinking that Louis Lumière’s train was going to run them over. They had no trouble recognizing the train, so they didn’t miss anything remotely resembling pictorial conventions, but failed to see the train as depicted. At the general level of all types of representation, we find
specifications of how we are to be addressed by its instances, i.e. singular pictures (or otherwise). These general ‘conventions’ form the second characteristic that I attribute to representation, i.e. its non-egocentricity. Non-egocentricity distinguishes representations from real-life situations. Perceiving real-life events is egocentric: the perceiving person is in a spatio-temporal context shared with the things he observes. Moving his body normally brings about a relevant change in the world he perceives. Wollheim recognizes this but makes little use of it in his account of depiction. Instead, he thinks that a distinct species of seeing is involved. However, nothing special seems to be happening to vision, whereas something is going on with the way our other senses are used i.e. with our perception as a whole. Of our own free will we impose upon ourselves specific moral and epistemological constraints: we refrain from acting in accordance with what we understand we are perceiving, and tolerate the fact that the information gathered by our other senses is not contributing to our understanding of a painting. The thing on the wall and we who look at it are, together, in a different spatio-temporal context from that of the events represented in the picture. This is a logical point, not an empirical one. There is no gradual transition from small distances to large ones, to looking through binoculars, to, finally, looking at a painting. The break is between the last one and all those preceding it. Refraining from direct morally-relevant responsive actions in the case of a representation is chosen beforehand, i.e. irrespective of what we are going to see in the particular painting, whereas choosing not to help the drowning child that we see through our binoculars, is morally significant. Disjunctively, abstaining from direct interference, non-egocentricity, and pro tanto anticipation of homomodal recurrence are necessary conditions for something to be a representation. Together they are sufficient.

How do we go about entering this non-egocentric world of which we form no part? Wollheim’s notion of twofoldness captures this problem of transgression. ‘Twofoldness’ pertains to the way in which the paint marking the surface of the canvas on the wall produces the meanings seen in the painting.25 The artist’s individual style (another of Wollheim’s many contributions to aesthetics)26 is what both forms the work’s means of expression, and guides the beholder’s stepping out of the egocentric into the represented, the non-egocentric. The marks that are painted on the canvas and exist in the beholder’s space—who might touch or smell them—lead him towards the meaning of the
painting which he cannot touch or smell but must enter watching.²⁷
The non-egocentricity of represented events provides the clue to understanding the apparent discrepancy between what a depicted event looks like (which—symmetrically— 'resembles' what the picture looks like), and what the picture expresses. In everyday perception, variations between the looks of a person and the meaning of his expression cannot possibly be as contingent as they can be in a representation, where a total independence of the mental life of the character from that of the actor may obtain. 'Egocentricity' explains this: a real person's looks as well as mental life are equally present to the perceiver. His responses may induce an expressor to adjust his expression. The expression and its perception are reciprocal. There is, however, no such reciprocity with regard to representations. For an adequate understanding of artistic expression, therefore, the logical thing to do is to compare it to representation and its non-egocentricity, rather than to egocentric expression—with which artistic expression only shares name and subject matter—the experiential—but not the bodily and spatio-temporal characteristics.

5. Expression as Representation.

Artistic expression, I submit, is a kind of representation: of experiential events. Its egocentric specifications are general and depend on the kind of representation it comes with. To perceive the artistic expression of a painting we need our eyes (and our imagination); for that of music our ears (and our imagination), etc. Represented experiential events pertain either to the work's subject matter (or persona) or to the artist's stylistic variations, but whichever variety is at stake, it is the artist's variations in the material which intimate them—i.e. suggest them and make them intimate to the beholder.²⁸ Clues ensuing from depicted natural expression are merely among the pointers available to the artist to steer our empathizing in relevant directions. As such, such clues do not form a necessary ingredient for an account of artistic expression. In line with the definition of representation given above, I propose this definition of expression:

"Something which is perceived egocentrically is expressive of X if and only if it is a representation of X, and X is
an experiential event, i.e. a phenomenally conscious event."

"Something represents an experiential event if and only if it while being perceived non-egocentrically causes us to anticipate (in a postulatable world) the homomodal recurrence of experiential events."

If we want expression to answer to the first of representation’s characteristics, i.e. the anticipated homomodal recurrence, we should identify a perceptual modality specific to it. Neither one of our five senses is available because they would either be the one(s) responsible for the type of representation that the expression is mounted on (e.g. vision with painting) on account of which they cannot explain the need for a distinct notion for the conveyal of psychological aspects in the meaning of a work of art (Goodman might favour this outcome); or, alternatively, they would be different senses which would call for new phenomenological specifications that regulate the import of these senses, which specifications are not forthcoming. The perceptual mode responsible for our recognition of expression (empathy)—I take to be an act of imagination, and a mode of sensitivity as essential to our appreciation of works of art as it is to our understanding of people.

Natural, i.e. egocentric empathy can be contrasted with natural, i.e. egocentric seeing and hearing on account of the first-person privilege pertaining to the events perceived by it, such as those that are expressed in a sad face and desolate gesturing. I am not saying that the mental is not accessible from a third-person point of view; on the contrary, it is. However, it is accessible only to the point of knowing that a person is having some specific experience—which is a represented (possibly exclusively propositional) type of knowing—not of knowing how it would be for that person to have it. The arguments are familiar. Peter has lost his parents in a plane crash. Knowing the intentional object of his sadness and confusion, we may have a better understanding of the experience Peter is going through than Peter has, because, among other things, he is confused by his loss. Peter’s first-person phenomenal awareness of the state he is in, however, should remain inaccessible to us. He is the one going through the turmoil, not we. As it is, by empathizing with Peter’s first-person awareness we apply different concepts than we would if we were merely acknowledging his loss. In empathy, our imagination introduces some of our own personal
memories and anticipations. By empathizing with Peter, we associate our own mental events with what we know (propositionally) that Peter is going through and guess is his psychological repertoire, and do not stop before having re-enacted an emotion which, we find, resembles in intentional structure and force—in phenomenology, Wollheim would say (see TL)—what we take Peter to be expressing. Our access to Peter’s mental life will be as appropriate as the many clues that emanate from his facial and gestural expressions. Such clues should have the type of coherence characteristic of a true theory: what the gestures tell us will be in accordance with Peter’s face or grunting, etc. And this holds over time as well: if Peter suddenly starts smiling and jumping about, this will affect our thoughts about his sadness. In short, natural expression addresses all our senses and is spatio-temporally complex, and, I surmise, this is so in a way that no representation will ever achieve. Needless to say, egocentricity is what explains the difference, because, lastly, and most importantly for distinguishing empathy from mere acknowledgement: we are in Peter’s vicinity. This enables him to change his expression if he finds our responses inadequate to his fears, feelings or expectations: empathy implies second-person reciprocity.

Such reciprocity is absent from the appreciation of representations—due to the non-egocentricity of representations. The fact that in appreciating art our empathy is disconnected from our actions—we do not storm the stage to rescue the menaced heroin—does not go against the thesis that empathy is what it takes to understand expression; it merely symptomizes the non-egocentricity of expression. Nothing is wrong with the empathy, but something is with other parts of our perceptual apparatus. Because of non-egocentricity, in contradistinction with real-life empathy and the actions that surround it, our actions toward art works can achieve nothing in the range of preventing, enhancing, or changing the represented experiences empathized with.  

In artistic empathy there can be no such thing because the mental life in question is in a different context from that of the beholder: it is represented.

This is my suggestion: with artistic empathy the imagination is caused to actively constitute what is not present before the senses. An artist’s individual style, consequently, if it is to be expressive, has to hold ‘open spots’ for the beholder’s imagination to fill in, in order to produce the mental life that is expressed. The way I put it here seems wrong though, because artistic expression is not such as to make us cry whenever a character is in
grief. In contrast, my account is not emotivist or evocational. Imagination is merely supposed by my account to expect a coherent homomodal recurrence of the mental. Hence the second characteristic in my definition of expression. The anticipation is achieved by a re-enactment which, due only to its non-egocentric origin will lack certain symptoms that are pertinent in its real-life, egocentric counterpart, such as direct constraints on one’s agency. Artistically expressed mental states or events are produced by the beholder’s imagination effected by the guidance issuing from what is sensuously present in the work (and what isn’t, even though being expected), and are, therefore, as such not in any particular mind, nor do they belong to anyone in particular. Instead, the beholder merely does what he is supposed to do, much like the slavering of Pavlov’s dogs upon hearing the bells (without the food).

This also answers a question about the intelligibility of my account: how can an experience that is caused by a work of art to appear in us, at the same time be represented in the work? This question exclusively addresses the concept of artistic empathy, or experiential representation, as though the understanding of depiction were immune to it. It isn’t. Perceiving a picture differs as much from everyday vision as artistic empathy differs from everyday empathy. When we understand that a picture depicts a house, we do not see a real house, even though somehow we succeed ‘naturally’ to make the coloured spots on the flat surface before us into the three-dimensional object that is represented. In the cases of representations, the phenomenalities of perception and empathy are different, but their phenomenology of being addressed non-egocentrically is not. Natural empathy is a common aspect of perception, so there is every reason to suppose that the ability of non-egocentric address should function equally well in the case of artistic empathy as it does in the case of artistic vision. The intelligibility question, when applied to depiction, goes like this: how can a house that is caused by a picture to appear phenomenal in us, at the same time be represented in the work? A weird question. Isn’t this what representation is all about?

According to Richard Wollheim expressive properties, like colours, are identified “through experiences that are both caused by those properties and of them” (CPE 149). This comparison supports my argument that both the pictorial and the expressive are elements in works of art that cause us to perceive these works in certain ways. However, there is a difference in indexicality between
secondary qualities and expressive properties which calls for an approach like the one proposed here. I can bring out this difference by looking at the use of samples. Samples can be used as a proof of the existence of some specific colour. Colour samples derive their functionality from being available to a third-person perspective. This remark about samples obviously is neutral to the problem of the phenomenality of secondary qualities. The experiential, on the contrary, which I take to be expression’s subject matter, is first-person privileged, such that if a sample of someone else’s mental life were at hand instead of merely the word naming it, and if we might use it to establish whether the mental events exemplified really are there in some or other person, this sample would have to be exclusively first-person accessible. It would have to be (able to be) mine alone. The property that causes us to perceive an expressive property is not accessible in the same manner the pictorial is. None of the senses—because they allow a third-person perspective—would suffice to perceive the sample, and as a consequence, some distinct homomodality would be required for a naturalist representation of the experiential.

My approach enables us to see how, in the case of pictures, the basis of the difference between representation and expression lies in their respective subject matters. The representation of a picture is its visually accessible aspect—that which conveys the visual aspect of the represented. It is perceived by the sense of vision. A picture’s expression is the aspect which conveys an experiential dimension. It is perceived by the imagination—the power that has us perceive elements of reality which do not directly present themselves to our senses. Secondly, the account I am proposing helps us to understand why in practice we cannot locate the conflict involved in a desolate portrayal of a group of happy people. The desolation in the artistic expression changes the shade of happiness the represented character is depicted as going through, by changing the way we are to perceive it. Both expressive elements are perceived-cum-constituted by our imagination, which should explain why they mix. Perception is informed by the co-operation of the various senses and the imagination—whether we are talking about egocentric or non-egocentric perception. Above, I turned away from Wollheim’s position because he attributed too much cognitive functionality to vision and isolated imagination by attenuating it to fantasy. It is by now evident how imagination can be functionally distinguished from the operations of (and data provided by) the senses, but as functioning integrally to perception. But I do not
narrow imagination down to fantasy. And this correction should not remain inconsequential. Whereas it is perfectly intelligible, as Wittgenstein remarked, to think of reports about our own mental life as sophisticated expressions rather than as representations, in the case of worlds perceived non-egocentrically this distinction simply makes no sense. Here expression should be taken as representation.33

Notes
1. PA 46-80 contains an extensive discussion of these matters.
2. The discussion of expressive perception is in PA 80-89 and CPE. Like seeing-in, expressive perception presupposes certain beliefs, but, unlike seeing-in, “it also presupposes a deep part of our psychology, [...] a mechanism for coping with feelings, moods, and emotions” PA 80.
3. Cf. Wollheim, who (this volume, 35-36) poses a set of questions regarding a classical landscape painting with ruins, arguing that at one point we can no longer see things in a picture. He thinks we might want to say that we can see the columns, can see that they came from a temple, can see that this temple was overthrown, but cannot see “[the columns] as having been thrown down some hundreds of years ago by barbarians wearing the skins of wild asses”. What is it that we cannot see: the exact time-span, that the barbarians wore skins, that these were the skins of asses, or that these asses—before they were skinned—were wild? One wonders where, according to Wollheim, the borderline between seeing and imagining has been crossed. It is a long way from opposing the (Lessing’s) claim that the visual is non-conceptual to claiming that we can see everything that is readily conceptualized—supposing that is where the borderline was crossed in this example. Also, all that we can see in a picture need not for that reason be depicted in it. Subtitles structure our perception of pictures in ways vastly different from how the picture itself structures our perception of it. This should be part of the conclusion issuing from a comparison of pictures to descriptions. Cf. Pictures and Language, MD 185-92, and Harrison, Chapter 2, this volume. On the projective nature of expression, see CPE.
4. With this thought Bruce Vermazen started his Expression as Expression.
5. Which it is not to Nelson Goodman, one major voice in defending the meant opposition.
7. This position is also defended in Jerry Levinson's Musical Expressiveness. But see Savile, this volume, 109.
8. In PA, chap. I. What the Artist Does. Cf. also Podro, Depiction and the Golden Calf, and his chapter in this volume, Section II, for subtle criticisms.
9. Indeed, we are not interested here in ‘literal’ cases of the depiction of a person’s natural expression of sadness. So there will be no tears or saddened looks in our picture.
10. Paul Crowther (in Art and Embodiment. From Aesthetics to Self-Consciousness) takes this line of thought in developing an ecological definition of art which takes the artist’s body position as its starting point. Wollheim too (in Seeing-As, Seeing-In, and Pictorial Representation, henceforth SSPR) sees the work of art as the output of the artist’s intentions; however, he does not equate this output with the artist’s expression, but thinks the intentions introduce a notion of correctness in our perception. He rightly proposes a psychological view of the way we perceive expression.
11. Cf. Malcolm Budd, and, especially, Graham McFee, 201 ff., this volume.
14. Currie Image and Mind, 9-12 (Section 1.5). Henceforth IM.
15. A definition of the genus of representation would change the “homomodal recurrence of some of the thing’s properties” into something which includes imagination in a more independent role. See also Robert Hopkins, this volume, 378, n. 2.
16. IM 73. Currie takes the egocentricity of mirrors as an argument for their (genuine) transparency, as opposed to the non-transparency of photos. He is arguing here against Scruton’s, Photography and Representation.
17. If, for example, music is to represent, it must on my account be taken to represent sounds, or its representing is delivered conventionally. Then again, perhaps there are other modalities involved with music apart from its sounds, which allow it to represent naturalistically after all. This latter point obviously needs elaboration, which I will partly provide.
18. Nor are they Wollheim’s or McFee’s (196, this volume).
19. This move is motivated methodologically: ontological questions stem from an epistemological point of view—one which reduces the surface differences between types of representation to matters of their truth, asking questions about whether or not the represented exists. I have chosen instead an approach that is explicitly aesthetic in nature,
because it enables us to analyze the differences that pertain to types and forms of representation long before the matter of their potential truth is at stake: people know that they are confronted with some specific type of representation, and know what is represented long before they know whether or not the represented is actually existent: aesthetics precedes epistemology.

20. Which is as far as I think the primitiveness of seeing-in goes. This also involves an approach of what Wollheim (PA 72-75, SSPR) calls paintings’ ‘twofoldness’.

21. For an excellent discussion of these epistemological matters, see IM, 53-56.

22. See Goodman, Languages of Ar, Chapter One, and Goodman, Seven Strictures on Similarity.

23. And there is this extra advantage over Goodman in that from my aesthetic point of view we do not have to take pictorial representation as an instance of denotation. See also note 18.

24. I assume a Kantian notion of imagination as the mental power that brings before the mind things that are absent to the senses (as does Paul Crowther in Chapter 5, this volume, 112). Unlike fantasy, imagination is a power of perception in its own right. It—imagination—is not instrumental, is not obedient to the will, whereas fantasy is. Certain defects of autism testify to this (and I am proposing this—cursorily—as an alternative to the Theory of Mind option). An autistic person can be described (in terms of mind, not brain) as lacking the faculty of imagination. At a high level, autistics typically are unsuccessful in imagining what experiences other persons are having. Already at the lower level of taking in the data of the senses, autistics experience trouble selecting those data that conform to the concepts we use to describe the world. Imagination is a power of perception, one more basic than fantasy. It is imagination which introduces the absent elements necessary to empathize with an act of expression.

25. Cf. SSPR. Cf. also Podro, Depiction and the Golden Calf.

26. In PS.

27. In keeping with Wollheim’s insistence that the experience of expression be perceptual.

28. Cf. Gerwen, Art and Experience, chap. 7, for an account of intimation. Because different art forms employ different means of intimation, no monolithic theory of expression is forthcoming, as Budd argues (99, this volume).

29. A feeling of what it is like to experience some specific thing. Michael Tye recognizes as essential properties of consciousness that it must be possessed and
that it entails a unique perspective onto the world. In: Ten Problems of Consciousness, 10-25.
30. This does not commit me to the thesis that we can only represent what strikes the eye (cf. the discussion of this position in PA 64-65). However, when pushed sufficiently, we make this distinction between what can and what cannot literally be seen in a picture. We will point differently to things available through different means of perception. Cf. Currie, Imagination and Simulation: Aesthetics Meets Cognitive Science.
31. This ought to solve the so-called paradox of fictional emotion. Cf. Gerwen, Fictionele emoties en representatie.
32. Cf. Graham McFee, this volume, Chapter 10, 363, n.5.
33. I thank Paul Crowther, Anthony Savile, Erik Benders, Alan Casebier, Berys Gaut, and the audience at the 1997 annual BSA conference in Oxford, for pushing me beyond some of my limitations.
References

works by Richard Wollheim:


Cross-references are to: