Recursion Theory

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- Infinite time Turing Machines

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- There is an interesting link from strange attractors in chaos theory to Goodstein's process.

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- Can be done directly by coding the halting problem, we give a shorter proof

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- The proof of (1) is a bit more involved

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Thus we obtain that PC is creative!