




I believe it when I see it - Reputation versus Experience

Eva van den Broek
ex-CAI 1997-2003

game theory - cooperation – fish simulation - experiment – discussion

Outline



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Beauty contest

1. **Everybody chooses secretly an integer number between 1 and 100 (inclusive).**
2. **The average of all chosen numbers is calculated.**
3. **This average is multiplied by 0.7 and then rounded to the closest integer.**
4. **The winner is the number that is closest to the number calculated in 3.**



Game theory

- Strategies incorporate what ‘the other’ does
- Predicts equilibria, where no-one can do better by changing their strategy
- Does, however, NOT predict behavior well

Problem of Cooperation



How can cooperation evolve in a world of rational agents?

- Everyone is better off by defecting:
 - Biologists: fitness of a defector is higher
 - Economists: 'utility' of a defector is higher
- Any conjectures?



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Conjectures

- Longer time horizon
- Kin selection ($rB - C > 0$)
- Direct reciprocity (Tit for Tat)
- Indirect reciprocity
 - group selection?
 - punishing?
 - reputation

Reputation mechanism

- Image scoring (Nowak and Sigmund, 1998)
- 100 players interact randomly
- cost < benefit, score = 0, strategy <-5,5>
- if coop last round, score +1
- next generation according to payoff
- If strategy = 0, “discriminating”

Evidence for image scoring

- People use image scoring (Wedekind and Milinski, 2000)
- People make strategic choices (Engelmann and Fischbacher, 2004)
- keep their image score above a threshold (Seinen and Schram, 2001)

Problem solved?

no.

Possibly wrong assumptions
needed for image scoring:

1. All exchanges are alike
2. People react to 'image' like 'experience'

Hypothesis

Reputation depends on homogeneity of population

→ Introducing heterogeneity in value of interactions leads to less cooperation

Evolutionary model (cleaner fish market)



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
Undersea market

- Repeated interaction
- Cleaner feeds on parasites; mutual benefit
- Cleaner fish can cheat on living tissue
- Client fish recognize and choose cleaners
- Client fish can end interaction

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Agents

fish



Type: $\Theta_L \Theta_H$

Discriminate/not

cleaners




Image score: 0 or 1

Strategy

Lifetime



All fish approach one cleaner and see his image score.

If cleaner cooperated last round, image score = 1; otherwise image score = 0.

If cleaner's image score $<$ fish's threshold level, the fish **flees**.

All fish reproduce and die

X 10

Evolution

Reproduction according to payoff

Client fish inherit threshold;
NOT type

Cleaner fish inherit strategy;
NOT image score


Homogeneous case

	fish	
cleaners	Θ_H	out
Cooperate	3,2	0,1
Defect	6,0	0,1

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Results homogeneous

Strategy frequencies



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Heterogeneous case

	fish		
cleaners	Θ_H	Θ_L	out
Cooperate	3, 2	1, 2	0, 1
Defect	6, 0	2, 0	0, 1


Strategies

cleaners	fish	
	Θ_H	Θ_L
Always Coop	C	C
Always Def	D	D
Cheater	D	C
Rev.Cheater	C	D

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Results heterogeneous

Strategy frequencies



Generations

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Conclusion

- After introducing heterogeneity, image scoring breaks down
- Cheater strategy thrives for this parameter constellation

Image scoring depends on the assumption of homogeneity



I believe it when I see it -
Reputation versus Experience

motivation

Reputation (info about previous behavior)
is a valuable institution to foster trust



- Job market



How do people interpret 'reputation'?



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motivation

Usual assumption:

reliable information from 3rd party (reputation)

=

information from own experience

For same history and experience, is this true?

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background


Bohnet and Huck (AER, 2004):

Partner treatment fosters trust in long run,
more than reputation does. Why?

1. Reputation = noisy signal
2. Experience leads to emotional response

Reputation = noisy signal


But: Cox and Deck (working paper, 2002):
trembling trust game: positive signal is rewarded
by 2nd movers



Experience leads to emotional response

Yes!


Camerer (2006) fMRI-scan shows
'affection'



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hypotheses

Differences in emotional response



Experience

- personal
- “hot”
- repeated

Reputation

- anonymous
- “cold”
- one shot

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Sender Score
Reputation
Monitor PDF

1. “Hot” experience => overreaction to positive / negative experience

2. Sense of repetition => more trust in partner, more forgiveness

hypotheses

“Hot” experience => overreaction to experience:

Partner + negative experience <


Reputation + negative experience + negative reputation

Sense of repetition => more trust in *Partner*:

Partner + negative experience >

Reputation + negative experience + negative reputation

experiment




experiment

- Binary trust game, played twice [part 1; part 2]
- Repetition unknown to subjects
- Fixed roles (player A and player B)
- 3 treatments- differ in part 2:
 - *Baseline* (same partner as part 1)
 - *Stranger* (stranger, but full information about behavior in part 1)
 - *Choice* (A chooses Partner or Stranger)
- Questionnaires: personality traits and emotions


experiment

part 1:



emotion
questionnaire

part 2:



personality traits
questionnaire

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subjects



CREED lab, summer 2006, 9 sessions

140 students (33 % female, 40 % economics)

Average age: 22

Average earnings: 10 euro (7,50-22,50)

30 minutes


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behavior: 1st round

- Total 70 observations
 - (42 same partner; 28 different partner)
- Players A (1st round):
 - trust: 41
 - no trust: 29
- Players B (1st round):
 - reward: 16
 - no reward: 54

behavior: 2nd round

- Decision to trust: A players (2nd round)
 - A players with no reward history



behavior: 2nd round

After “no reward”:

People prefer partner over stranger

- If playing with partner, people trust more
- Most subjects (7/11) chose to play with previous partner
 - when given the choice to play with same partner or with a stranger with same history

conclusions

- Reputation is valued (emotionally) differently from Own Experience
- Repetition hypothesis seems more likely than Overreaction
- The differences in trusting behavior are mediated by emotions

summary

A. Evolution did not work out

B. People are animals

C. AI is the mother of all sciences

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discussion

Is it valid question to answer by means of simulation/
experiment?

Can 'clean' lab environment say anything about external,
context-rich world?

Should we abstract from real world, like theory, or provide
more details, like real world? (In casu: provide cues for
recognition that stimulate 'attachment' and likeability)



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